



Daily Report

East Europe

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30 April 1991

NOTICE TO READERS: On 6 May 1991, the DAILY REPORT will begin phasing in new radio and television sourcelines that reflect how a station identifies itself. This change eliminates the "Domestic Service" and "Television Service" designations in favor of the station identification as broadcast. The presence of a new sourceline reflects this change in policy, rather than the establishment of a new station or network.

NOTICE TO READERS: * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

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People's Assembly Session Discusses Issues

Reviews Shengjin Incident, Constitution

AU2704202491 Tirana ATA in English 1818 GMT
27 Apr 91

[Text] Tirana, April 27 (ATA)—Today, at the morning sitting of the People's Assembly the deputies continued to discuss on the supreme state power organs the People's Assembly. [sentence as received] They said that under the current circumstances, the people expect from the deputies to elect the president and form the government. Likewise they approved the Article 18 on the number of sessions the Assembly may convene in one year.

Also many deputies discussed on the Article 19 related to the way of elections and the tasks of permanent and temporary commissions of the People's Assembly, which after being completed, was endorsed by over two thirds of ballots. Likewise, the Article 20 was approved by two thirds of ballots. Whereas as for the Article 21 they agreed that the presidencies of parliamentary groups discuss at break. The Article 22 with some completions as the law making initiative belongs to the president of the republic, the Council of Ministers, deputies and a group of 10 thousand electors was approved by two thirds of ballots.

At the end of the morning sitting the floor was given to Deputy Gramoz Ruci, who submitted the following report to the assembly :

On April 25, 1991, at about 18:00 hrs, nearly 700 persons rushed in the direction of Shengjin sea port. The border forces tried to restrain them firing warning shots into the air, but they did not succeed. Some of them went swimming and through simple means entered the ships anchored in the port.

Due to the intervention of the forces of the order, the normal state was restored after three hours.

On April 26, 1991, at about 10:00, citizens from Shkoder, Kruje and Lezhe gathered in the town of Shengjin as they were told on the good technical state of the ships. There were rumours in Shkoder that the ferry boat would come to carry the Shkoder youth. At about 11:00 hrs, these crowds and other citizens of Shengjin (amongst them women and children), approximately 1000 people, rushed in the direction of the port and managed to forcibly enter there.

Upon the persistence of the interior organs, a night ago the three ships which were in a good technical state laid off the coast, whereas two others did not leave under the pretext of serious defects.

About 300 persons grabbed "Zadrime" ship and headed to the other ships which were in a good technical state. The other forces of order who came from Lezhe intervened energetically and the normal situation was restored in the sea port.

A border ship prevented the "Zadrime" vessel from reaching the ships lying off the coast. In the meantime the persons on board a ship chanted: "Freedom democracy", "Communism ended", "The Army is with us".

At 15:00 hrs, the train carried from Shkoder huge crowds of people, which headed to Shengjin from different directions. At 17:00, approximately 4000 people gathered in Shengjin out of whom 700, with children in the forefront, headed to the military base to grab military ships.

With the frequent appeals and interventions of the forces of order, failing to realize their aim of illegally crossing the border, the crowd took the road of return, breaking windows and destroying various objects of Shengjin town.

The crowds of people going for Lezhe turned back the other crowds heading for Shengjin and gathered at the train station, new bridge of Drini down to the state bank, completely blocking the traffic. Following this the mob headed for the block of the committees and PTT [Post Telephone and Telegraph], launching already known slogans "Enver-Hitler", "Communism is gone", "We will do as in Shkoder", etc. And began stoning the forces of order and breaking the windows of the Executive Committee and PTT. After the intervention of the forces of order, the crowd returned and made for the city's main street, where it started to hurl stones at the trade units and those of public services along the road. Under the action of the forces of order, the crowd split into groups left the city and milled the train station. The police forces tried to make arrests at the station, but due to the objection and irritation of the crowd they failed to realize their aim. As the train came, the main crowd left for Shkoder.

At about 22:15 when the train was entering the Shkoder station, the mobs of people coming from Lezhe set fire to the last railway coaches. The flames swept three railway coaches and two citizens unidentified so far were burned.

Material damages are reported also at the Mjete station where windows are broken and other acts are committed.

The irritated mob, with about 300 persons entered the Shkoder City from various directions and broke the windows in 5 trade premises. The forces of order blocked the main directions and to actions to protect the important objects. 2 persons were detained. The forces of order took preliminary actions to protect the train station and other objects threatened to be attacked. There were no organised acts, or excesses in the city. The situation is relatively calm. In all the cases of illegal gatherings, beginning since February 20, 1991, the organisers line up children and women in front of the mobs. The aim is for the police not to attack, and if it attacks them under the law, then the press organs, speakers etc. have attempted to raise the people against the police and one cannot say they have failed to attain the goal.

In meetings and conversations, the political forces declare they dissociate themselves, they can do nothing with these forces, but not all of them really commit themselves and expose these stands in their press. The allusions in the press on the responsibilities of one or another party, or as it often happens on the police's responsibilities, do not serve the restraint of these uncontrolled acts and the curbing of the massive violation of the law.

The people desires to restore order, public calmness and security of people's life menaced by forces out of control and which are putting on fire, destroying and grabbing different objects, claiming innocent casualties. The people needs the president, the government so that the respective organisms function.

The forces of the order perform the tasks recognized by law under the difficult circumstances, but they cannot operate without the aid of all the organs of justice, power, political parties and social organisations.

This appeal for commitment on behalf of the people should come out from this Assembly.

The psychological and material state of the police forces is aggravated. This does not mean that they are discouraged, but they need the [words indistinct] people with no exception, particularly the tone as parliament, as legitimate representative of the people.

The session continues its proceedings.

At the afternoon sitting of April 27, which opened at 17:00 began the examination of the articles of Point B Chapter 2—the President of the Republic of Albania. Regarding Article 23, which gives the definition of the president as head of state, complements and correctness were made and finally the proposal which completes the figure of the president as representative of the unity of the whole people was approved. Numerous and prolonged contributions were made on Article 24, following which the proposal that there should be no less than two candidates for president was approved. Likewise the Article 25, which defines the swearing of the oath, and Article 26 were approved.

On Article 27, which deals with the competences of the President of the Republic, it was proceeded by approving the points of the article at first one by one and then as a whole. In general, through some minor remarks, mainly of an editorial character, the Points 1 to 6 of this article that have to do with the competences of the president to ensure the observation of the Constitution, laws, and to promulgate the laws and referendums decided upon by the People's Assembly, etc., were approved. On Point 7, which point to the competences of the president for the period between the two sessions, on the nomination and discharge of certain members of the government upon the proposal of the Council of Ministers, some deputies made remarks that the number of the government's members that might be discharged or nominated in this period be specified. These proposals were not approved

by a majority of votes, approving the article defining this as a "limited number." The Points 8 and 9 of this article, which define the competences for the nomination and discharge of the leading cadres of the central institutions according to the proposal of the government head and for chairing the meeting of the Council of Ministers, when the president deems it necessary, was not approved by the deputies and by a majority of votes they were removed from this article. Debates were conducted also on the point 10 for the competences of the president to dissolve the People's Assembly before the expiry of the legislature, after taking into consideration the opinion of the chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Presidency of the People's Assembly.

This point was approved with the supplement which defines that this cannot be done in the last six month of his mandate. The Points 11 to 20, which deal with the competences of the president on reaching international treaties, on nominating and discharging diplomatic representatives, on exercising the right to pardon, of the right to political asylum, etc., were also approved by the deputies.

The People's Assembly continues its proceedings.

Continues Constitutional Debate

AU2904145991 Tirana ATA in English 0800 GMT
29 Apr 91

[Text] Tirana, April 29 (ATA)—The examination of the Articles of Point B Chapter 2—The President of the Republic of Albania, continued at the sitting of the People's Assembly which opened on April 28 at 10:00 hrs.

Many discussions were made on Article 28, which sanctions that the acts issued by the President of the Republic to exercise the competences envisaged in some points of Article 27 should be confirmed either by the chairman of the Council of Ministers or by the respective minister. This article was approved by over two thirds of the votes, after a complement was made, adding also the other persons equal to the ministers.

The Article 29 which envisages the case when the post of the President of the Republic remains vacant for any reason and his competences are exercised by the chairman of the Presidency of the People's Assembly respectively was complemented regarding the timing to elect the new president, within 15 days, and this article was approved by over two thirds of the votes.

Article 30, the second paragraph of which envisages the question of the President's responsibility in cases of treachery to the homeland or violation of the Constitution and which defines that this might be raised at the People's Assembly at the request of no less than one fourth of the deputies, and the respective decision is taken by a majority of two thirds of the deputies were complemented. The request, besides one fourth of the deputies, might be made also by a number of members of

the Constitutional Council and the respective decision in this case should be taken by secret ballot. With these complements this article was approved by over two thirds of the votes.

After linguistic improvements, the Article 31 was as well approved. It defines the function of the President of the Republic of Albania as General Commander of the Armed Forces and chairman of the Defence Council and the aim of creating this Council, etc.

Then the chairman of the Presidency of the People's Assembly informed that the presidencies of the parliamentary groups have compiled a supplement to the Article 5 and a new point for the Article 15 of this law. The supplement of Article 5 says: "The activity of the political parties in the military units and institutions of the Ministry of the People's Defence and of the Ministry of the Interior, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and diplomatic representations abroad, in the Attorney General's offices, Investigator's offices and courts and other organs is prohibited. The way of depoliticization is defined by law."

The People's Assembly approved also the following new point of Article 15: "The People's Assembly exercises control over the activity of the Albanian Radio Television, Albanian Telegraphic Agency, and other mass media depending on it. The status of these organs is defined by law."

Then it was passed onto the examination of the articles of the chapter "The Supreme Organs of the State Administration." On Article 32, which defines the Council of Ministers as the highest executive and administrative organ and the procedure of electing it, there were many debates and the deputies demanded that a new more accurate formulation be made by the jurists and be put forward for approval.

The proceedings of April 28 closed. The assembly will resume its proceedings on April 29 at 10.00 hrs.

Resolution on Kosovo Issue

AU3004092491 Tirana ATA in English 1801 GMT
30 Apr 91

[Text] Tirana, April 30 (ATA)—The Albanian autochthonous people living in their territories, but included in the Yugoslav federal state and which as for its number takes the third place there, is facing a new threat of unprecedented consequences.

The big Serb chauvinism is not limited only in the grave systematic violations of the elementary rights of the Albanians, with their imprisonments, deportations and killings, but it is hurrying to eliminate the autonomy. This chauvinism has decided to go farther these days: to divide Kosovo into regions so that its medieval myth

take a real shape in the final account, thus carrying to the end the ugliest crime against mankind, that of genocide against about 3 million Albanians in their territories.

In this artifice and through the means and ways the big Serb leaders are using, they are trying to legalise the occupation of Kosovo threatening in this way the peace and stability not only in Yugoslavia but in the Balkans and Europe.

But it is common knowledge that the Albanian people of Kosovo have clearly voiced their sovereign will in the decisions of the assembly of Kosovo on July 2, 1990. Through this act they demand nothing more than the other Slav peoples in Yugoslavia. Therefore, the claim that allegedly the Albanians, being recognized as a people want to realise their immediate separatism, is a pretext to block every constructive initiative, to paralyse the other Slav peoples, stirring up in them the sick all-Slav idea of disbelief towards the non-Slav peoples.

In the talks on the Yugoslav crisis the Albanian people are being excluded, thus violating the universal principle of self-determination guaranteed by the federal Constitution itself. But it is not this people's fault to be an object of the old diplomacy of the states to divide it in two parts through dictate.

Therefore we demand :

1. An end be put to the systematic occupation and violence being exercised by the Serb state against the Albanian martyr people.
2. The Albanians in their own lands within the Yugoslav federal state be recognized as a people and nation and their participation in the talks on the new agreement as equal to the other peoples of Yugoslavia be guaranteed.
3. The regionalization of Kosovo should not be allowed.
4. All the rights of our Albanian brothers residing in their own territories in Yugoslavia guaranteed by Yugoslavia's constitution and Helsinki Acts including here the right to self-determination be recognized and observed.
5. The Albanian Government is authorized to intercede with the international states and organisations to guarantee their rights.

As very worrying questions we deem it necessary to appeal to the European and world public opinion for more understanding, for a greater and concrete commitment, so that the fire the big Serb chauvinists want to kindle be prevented, because such a fire would cause unlimited havoc.

Honoured deputies, we invite you to approve this resolution as it will be not only a message to our brothers but also a fundamental duty of half of our nation for the other half of it.

Opinion Poll Shows Opposition Lead Over BSP

AU2704193191 Sofia BTA in English 1742 GMT
27 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 27 (BTA)—A two-to-one supremacy of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) [SDS] over the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), greatest confidence in President Zhelyu Zhelev, disappointment in Mikhail Gorbachev, increased approval of the present Bulgarian Government—these are some of the basic conclusions from the sociological poll conducted in mid-April on the initiative of the Bulgarian Association for Fair Elections.

The poll was organized on the basis of a representative sample of the population in 126 polling districts which were picked at random and covered 1,118 persons. 47 percent of the respondents are men and 53 percent women, they are of age, represent all age groups, nationalities and education and social status groups.

Asked for which political force they would vote now, 36.4 percent of the respondents pointed to the UDF, 17.5 percent to the BSP, 10.3 percent to the Bulgarian Agrarian Party (BANU), 7.2 percent for the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF). 14.4 percent are hesitating, 10.7 percent will not vote at all and 3.4 percent would vote for other parties.

Asked whether they would vote in the same way as in the previous elections, 64 percent answered in the affirmative. The UDF preserves 78 percent of its electorate in the past elections, the BSP 51 percent, the BANU 67 percent and the MRF 79 percent of its electorate.

Asked which political force can take Bulgaria out of the crisis, 10 percent of the respondents opted for the present cabinet of Mr. Dimitur Popov, 23 percent for a government of the united opposition, 22 percent for a government of the UDF, 21 percent for a coalition government between the UDF and the BSP, 12 percent expressed no opinion, 7 percent opt for a government of the BSP and 5 percent for a government of a different party.

Thirty percent of the respondents have greatest confidence in President of the Republic Zhelyu Zhelev and 16 percent expressed no opinion on this issue. Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev is followed by the leader of the Social Democrats Dr. Petur Dertliev with 15 percent of the respondents, former prime minister Andrey Lukanov with 13 percent, Deputy Chairman of Parliament Ginyo Ganev with 10 percent, Prime Minister Dimitur Popov with 7 percent, BANU leader Viktor Vulkov with 5 percent, BSP leader Aleksandur Lilov with 3 percent and former president Petur Mladenov with 1 percent.

The lack of confidence standings are topped by Andrey Lukanov with 26 percent, followed by Aleksandur Lilov with 23 percent, 21 percent expressed no opinion, 11 percent of the respondents have no confidence in Zhelyu Zhelev, 7 percent in Petur Dertliev, 6 percent in Petur Mladenov, 4 percent in Dimitur Popov and 3 percent in

Viktor Vulkov. Only 1 percent of the respondents have no confidence in Ginyo Ganev.

Seventy-seven percent of the respondents support the disclosing of the files of the informers of the former State Security, while the remaining respondents express no opinion or support the idea either to destroy the files or to keep them secret.

Fifty-eight percent want former and present leaders who have violated the laws and human ethics "to be tried to the full extent of the law," 10 percent believe that these offenders should be brought to account only for major crimes, and 13 percent want such people removed from high posts.

Forty-nine percent of the respondents are dissatisfied with the declaration on the historical responsibility of the BSP made recently by Supreme Council of the BSP and believe that the responsibility of the BSP is much greater, 18 percent have not heard of this declaration, 14 percent expressed no opinion and 12 percent are fully satisfied. According to 4 percent of the respondents the BSP is not responsible and according to 3 percent the responsibility of the BSP is much smaller than the declared one.

Asked what they think of Mikhail Gorbachev, 50 percent of the respondents answered that they used to approve of him but no longer do so, 19 percent of the respondents have always approved of him, 18 percent expressed no opinion, 10 percent have never approved of him and 2 percent did not approve of him in the past but do so now.

Only 8 percent of the respondents assess the work of parliament as good, 47 percent as satisfactory and 39 percent as bad. As regards the president these percentages are 48, 32 and 11 respectively, the government 36, 42 and 12 respectively, and the party and state leadership of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] headed by Todor Zhivkov (before November 10, 1989)—9, 10 and 72 percent respectively.

The attitude to the government has improved considerably in spite of the unpopular measures it introduced in the implementation of the economic reform. According to the leaders of the sociological team Dr. Yordan Venedikov and Ivaylo Parchev this comes to prove that the Bulgarian people realizes the indispensability of the painful economic reform.

Zhelev Supports Inquiry Into Pope's Attack

PM2604150891 Rome AVANTI! in Italian
24 Apr 91 p 4

[Interview with President Zhelyu Zhelev by Valter Vecellio; place and date not given]

[Text] [Vecellio] Mr. President, at the European conference in Strasbourg a year ago you said that you were

determined to order an inquiry to shed light on the attack on the pope 10 years ago. What is the reason for this initiative?

[Zhelev] Bulgaria is trying to emerge from totalitarianism. Regarding the crimes committed in the past, we have no choice, in the eyes of the world, but to try to go all the way in seeking the truth. We want to eliminate the dark spots that burden our country's recent past. I am referring to events such as the attack on the pope or the murder of the dissident, Markov, in London. Our aim is to make a permanent break with the past regime, to read everything that was written in those dark chapters, to understand, and then to close them. In May it will be 10 years since the attack on the pope. So it is inevitable that the issue will be raised, and we want more than anyone for matters to be clarified. Journalistic work, the examination of records, everything necessary to establish or ascertain whether or not there was Bulgarian involvement in the attack. Whatever the truth, it does not matter; we want it to be established at last. Nobody wants the truth more than the Republic of Bulgaria.

[Vecellio] One recent visitor to Sofia was Allen Weinstein, the president of an American foundation, the Washington Center for Democracy, who intends to open an inquiry to shed light on the obscure aspects of the attack. You met with him. Why that foundation? What did you say to one another?

[Zhelev] On a U.S. visit last year I attended a working lunch with THE WASHINGTON POST's staff, and on that occasion of course we discussed what was happening in Bulgaria, the current process of change. What surprised me was that all that did not impress the newspaper's staff. What interested them was the attack on the pope. I therefore realized that the international and American community is on a different wavelength, has a different attitude. I explained what I knew, that we, too, want to know the truth so we can distance ourselves from the regime. Obviously my remarks prompted some interest. The next day THE WASHINGTON POST gave them prominent coverage. Professor Weinstein probably read that article and began to develop an interest in the affair. We met a year ago at the European conference in Strasbourg. He told me that the foundation that he heads intends to carry out an international inquiry with the help of journalists, intellectuals, and scientists in an attempt to establish what happened. Of course I told him that I am willing to grant Bulgaria's complete support, and that they can count on our cooperation. On a recent trip to Sofia Professor Weinstein visited the Interior Ministry and met with leaders and officials of various bodies. There will be a conference in Bulgaria in May during which the working reports and conclusions of these investigations will be presented. Of course I can assure you that everything that depends on us will be done. We will be grateful to whoever wants to help in ascertaining the facts.

[Vecellio] Do you consider it credible that the Bulgarian secret services of the past communist regime could have been involved in the attack?

[Zhelev] This is a very difficult question to answer. It is very hard. I must admit that during the past 10 years my opinion has changed at various times. There have been moments when I was very ready to believe that there could have been Bulgarian involvement in the attack; at other times I doubted it. I consider this new inquiry necessary because in principle I am sure that our communist regime was capable of such an act. However, I cannot say whether there was Bulgarian involvement, a Bulgarian connection, in the attack on the pope. I have not the slightest doubt that the communist regime was capable of such a thing. However, if there was Bulgarian involvement, then it certainly cannot have been independent; the conspiracy was certainly organized on a larger scale. I repeat: If there was Bulgarian involvement in the attack, then the Bulgarians were only helpers.

[Vecellio] In view of the latest events, do you know whether the Italian authorities have contacted you to try to shed light on this affair?

[Zhelev] So far I am not aware that the Italian authorities have shown any desire or intention to take part in the investigation initiated by Professor Weinstein. I assume that the foundation behind the initiative will invite Italians, too, as well as figures from other countries. However, I have no information about this.

Deputy Prime Minister on Security Forces Tasks

AU2804192391 Sofia BTA in English 1839 GMT
28 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 28 (BTA)—Bulgarian intelligence personnel has been reduced by a half, Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Dimitur Ludzhev said in a televised interview today. Mr. Dimitur Ludzhev is cochairman of the competent governmental commission working on the problems of the Security Forces.

In cooperation with foreign intelligence services, at the beginning of this year the Bulgarian Security Forces carried out two successful operations against terrorist groups, Mr. Ludzhev said without going into details.

Dwelling—in response to a question—on the changes in the Ministry of the Interior, he said that in this ministry there are excellent professionals but also many people "who have inherited the defective thinking of the past" as well as relatives of responsible functionaries, using the Secret Services as a spring-board to "sweet life" in the West. These two categories of people were hit the hardest by the personnel cuts.

Experts of the Secret Services are inquiring into tip-offs about violations of the law by some former dignitaries, including some of their former chiefs. These experts, who are members of the working groups with the governmental commission investigating the activities of the

former State Security, have been subjected to pressure and even threatened with physical violence. Despite all this they are working conscientiously and efficiently, guided by their striving for justice. They know much more than we do about our past and their wish for a just punishment of those responsible is enormous, Mr. Ludzhev said.

The commission has decided to attach the property of several scores of companies suspected of being involved in illegal operations, trade in arms and export of capital as well as to impose bail on those former dignitaries who are under investigation and who are trying to evade responsibility by fleeing abroad.

Bulgaria is reassessing her intelligence interests, Mr. Ludzhev said. He specified that in future this country will maintain only official and "gentleman-like" contacts both with the Western special services and with the KGB. According to the deputy prime minister negotiations are underway with the KGB for placing relations on an official basis.

Decentralization and greater autonomy of the individual services is the main principle in the setting up of the new and updated structure of the Ministry of the Interior, Mr. Ludzhev said. The National Service in Defense of the Constitution (the Counterintelligence) is turning into an information service not competent to carry out executive and penal activities, according to the deputy prime minister. Only professionals will remain in the security bodies, professionals who have not been involved in any scandals of the past, he said.

The measures taken by the government exclude the possibility for the restoration of the Political Police in Bulgaria. In this respect Sofia has outstripped some advanced countries where there are such structures, according to Mr. Ludzhev.

President's National Security Adviser Interviewed

*AU2604205391 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 18 Apr 91 pp 1, 2*

[Interview with Major General Stoyan Andreev, president's adviser on national security and Armed Forces affairs, by Colonel Ivan Ganchev and Senior Lieutenant Krasimir Uzunov; place and date not given: "I Do Not Daydream, But Make Calculations"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [NARODNA ARMIYA] What are the first steps that should be taken in developing the national security concept?

[Andreev] In my opinion, the first thing that we should do, within the next month, is to complete the first version of the specialists' stated position on how Bulgaria's national security system should look. This having been done, we should speedily develop treaty relationships with our neighbors.

We should postpone no further the drafting of the treaty with the Soviet Union, and perhaps with Russia as well, depending on the circumstances. Here, we should adopt a different approach. Our relations with Russia and the Soviet Union should be developed within the framework of the new all-European structures. Our Soviet colleagues, with whom I have been in contact on these problems, share the same view.

At the same time and in parallel with this, we should prepare our country for entry into the all-European structures. At present, emotional considerations concerning preserving the good old links with the fraternal countries are being brought to the forefront of attention. However, the problems are much more serious. Until we integrate in real terms with all the European structures, the defensive ones included, we cannot obtain the guarantees that we need so much. In this context, what the Atlantic Club is doing is something much more useful; the same is true of the declaration by the members of the Grand National Assembly regarding contacts with the NATO countries, which has still not appeared in the press. In this field, our former allies have made much more progress than we have.

To achieve all this, we will have to radically improve the coordination between the National Security Commission of the Grand National Assembly, the National Security Council, and the government departments with direct responsibilities for security.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] As the president's adviser, would you recommend that he visit NATO Headquarters in Brussels?

[Andreev] Yes, I would boldly advise him to do this. However, beforehand we should make serious preparations for the talks. I believe that such a visit could be very beneficial for Bulgaria. We would have an opportunity to discuss the issue of them providing us with technologies that occupy prominent positions in the COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] list. This list serves as an indication of the trust shown toward a given country. Hard as it is for me as a Bulgarian, I would like to point out almost all the bans on products in the list have been lifted for Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, but for us little has changed. Unless this issue is resolved, our production will continue to fall behind, in terms of both quantity and quality, but most of all technologically.

I would also ask the president to raise in Brussels the issue of fully utilizing the production capacity of our military industrial complex, which is yet another drama of life and death for Bulgaria.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] If you are asked to dream of the future, how do you imagine Bulgaria's national security will look in the year 2000?

[Andreev] I do not daydream, but make cold calculations. In the year 2000, I would like Bulgaria to be harmoniously integrated into all the European structures, including the

military ones, while vividly retaining its national image. I would like my country to be at the same level as Sweden, for example, regarding its Army, industry, culture, and national unification.... This is how I would like to see my native land. Possibilities for this exist. Let us achieve a national consensus and declare: "Bulgaria, this is your goal; pursue it, as your future lies here."

Minister Pushkarov on Progress of Economic Reform

AU2904113591 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian
25 Apr 91 p 1

[Mariya Draganova report: "Structural Reform Still Lacks Legal Foundation"]

[Text] The structural reform plans a profound transformation of our economy. However, it cannot be implemented because of the lack of a legal foundation, Ivan Pushkarov said at a briefing at the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Services on 24 April.

Pushkarov objects to using the delay in the reform to obtain political benefits.

The gasoline stations cannot be privatized without first canceling the 1947 law on the state monopoly over oil. The moratorium on privatization has been canceled only in the spheres of trade, services, and tourism, he pointed out.

The Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Services expects that within 10 days the first companies will be ready with their dissolution protocols, and thus their monopolization and privatization could begin.

The subject of restructuring the debts of the companies subordinated to the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Services has been analyzed. About 60 percent of those companies will be able to pay their debts within three-four years with some assistance on the part of the state.

The value of resources immobilized in the sphere of construction that has been halted amounts to 17 billion leva. Some of those construction projects will simply be abandoned. Otherwise, they will swallow additional immense capital investments. However, a part of the uncompleted construction projects will be offered to foreign investors, Pushkarov said.

National Strategy Urged for Natural Gas Supplies

AU2704151391 Sofia VECHERNI NOVINI
in Bulgarian 18 Apr 91 p 2

[Dimitur Kadiyski report: "The Energy Crisis Reminds Us That a Strategy Is Needed"]

[Excerpts] What might occur to you if you read a short report in some newspaper that Iran was looking in Western Europe for buyers for its liquefied natural gas?

The expert immediately starts thinking about...a strategy. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria consumes about seven million cubic meters of natural gas. Apart from being used as a source of energy and heat, it forms a basic raw material for our heavy chemical industry. We should add here that some of the products derived from natural gas are well accepted in hard currency markets.

This is the situation in general. However, when one looks into the details, one discovers that our national gas pipeline system has free capacity, and that the dollar price that we expect to have to start paying for natural gas poses a threat to a number of production facilities in our heavy chemical industry.

"Among the possible solutions to the problem, I would like to suggest utilizing our country's geographical position," states Emil Tishinov, an expert at the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. "It is the accepted world practice to supply countries through whose territories transit gas pipelines pass with certain quantities of natural gas free of charge, as a kind of fee for services provided. Certain Central European countries obtain 20-25 percent of their natural gas requirements in this way. It is also the practice to supply considerable amounts of gas free of charge in return for countries taking part in the construction of gas pipelines and associated facilities on their territories. In this context, it is a good idea for us "to rediscover" Bulgaria's position on the crossroads between the Middle East and Western Europe. In this sense, our strategic task is to seek ways of increasing the amount of natural gas transiting through our country."

What are the possibilities on which this idea is based?

In addition to the main national gas ring, the gas pipeline from the USSR to Turkey also runs through Bulgarian territory. In 1992 a branch from this pipeline to Greece is due to come into operation. This gas pipeline passes close to the Yugoslav border. However, at the moment, negotiations are frozen between Yugoslavia and the USSR. The pipeline in question is utilized to less than 50 percent of its capacity, and accordingly we receive smaller free deliveries of natural gas. It is in our national interest to actively promote the resumption of negotiations between the USSR and Yugoslavia with a view to achieving a positive result. This will provide us with a total amount of 400 million cubic meters of free gas. The question arises of what should be done with the unused 50 percent of the pipeline's capacity. [passage omitted]

"The facts are clear. The question is, how should we draft our strategy," Mr. Tishinov concludes. We have a number of technical prerequisites for joining in such construction projects. The mere existence of a completed pipeline route through the whole of Bulgaria's territory is no small advantage, nor should we underestimate the intentions expressed by leading world oil companies to make major investments in the Balkan countries. Some of these companies would be interested in taking part in

building a gas pipeline from Iran through Turkey and Bulgaria to Western Europe. [passage omitted]

Power Industry's Financial Problems Discussed

*AU2904211591 Sofia BTA in English 1844 GMT
29 Apr 91*

[Text] Sofia, April 29 (BTA)—Bulgaria's power industry is in dire financial straits and if the prices of energy remain unchanged the industry's debts will reach 10 billion leva by the end of the year, Mr. Lyudmil Genov, chairman of the Power Engineering Committee, told a press conference today.

As of February 1, 1991 the government liberalized the prices of goods and services but retained its control on energy prices, fixing them at a level three times lower than production costs. The 1991 budget act does not envisage any subsidies for the power engineering committee. The financial condition of the industry is further aggravated by the fact that most of the energy is imported from the Soviet Union and is now paid for in convertible currency.

The management of the Power Engineering Committee suggested that the state cover part of the deficit while the remaining part be covered by raising the prices of electricity and fuels. It also proposed that the prices of electricity for household use be revised only slightly or not revised at all. Thus, business consumers will bear the brunt, paying thrice as much for electricity. According to the committee's estimates, the rise in the prices of goods and services resulting from higher fuel prices should not exceed 14 per cent.

The enterprises should pay the real price of energy which would force them to seek energy-saving technologies, the leaders of the Power Engineering Committee and the Parliamentary Power Engineering Committee said. If the financial situation of the industry is not normalized it will be impossible to solve the problems built up over the years. The power generating capacities are worn out and often break down, so they should be replaced and modernized. The safety of the nuclear power plant at Kozloduy requires a lot of money. There are problems with understaffment and with the Soviet-made equipment which is often out of order and whose repair is very expensive and requires foreign currency. Yet, the Kozloduy Power Plant generates about 40 per cent of the country's electricity and it will be impossible to do without it. An accident is hardly likely to occur at the power plant, the chairman of the Power Engineering Committee maintains but admits that the equipment available in Bulgaria is not precise enough to calculate the risk.

Money for Wages, Compensation Payments Sought

*AU2704144391 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian
19 Apr 91 pp 1, 2*

[Dimitrana Aleksandrova report]

[Text] The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare has no problems with finding money for pensions and family allowances. Minister Emiliya Maslarova stated on 18 April, after the government had examined her proposal to provide funds for paying pensions in May.

According to Mrs. Maslarova, there is a considerable imbalance between the value of the compensation payments that have to be made and the contributions to the State Social Security Fund. About 3,700,000 workers receive 270 leva in compensation, but only about 90 leva is deducted from their wages as social security contributions. In addition, 2,400,000 pensioners have to receive compensation payments of 182 leva; 1,500,000 children are each due 100 leva in allowances; and 170,000 mothers are to receive compensation payments for pregnancy, giving birth, or looking after children. Thus, the receipts of the State Social Security Fund barely cover 35 percent of the outgoings.

Furthermore, Mrs. Maslarova said that enterprises are delaying payment of social security contributions. In March 500,000 leva was received, whereas 839 million leva is needed for the April pension payments.

The banks are slow in making money transfers, and difficulties are also arising regarding the fact that pensions are paid in advance, whereas contributions are deducted from the wages of the employed at the end of the month.

Up to 10 April, the Main Social Security Administration had run up a debt of 1,638.4 million leva, the greater part of this being financed by a credit taken from the Bulgarian National Bank at a high interest rate. Mrs. Maslarova pointed out that the interest on the loan amounted to 28 million leva in March alone, equivalent to the cost of pensions for the population of a medium-sized okrug. She is considering asking the National Assembly for an interest-free loan from the Bulgarian National Bank.

She will also ask for the State Social Security Fund to be granted a subsidy of 1.3 billion leva from the republican budget to meet the compensation payments due for February and March under Council of Ministers Decree No. 8.

The Ministry of Finance must find 130 million leva by 1 May to make the indexation payments due for December 1990 and January 1991. Mr. Ivan Kostov will also have to pay out money for the May and June compensation payments.

The problem, however, lies in production. Mrs. Maslarova said that recently the value of wages and compensation payments has been more or less equal.

Yesterday's government meeting did not only deal with money problems. Interior Minister Khristo Danov reported that the enterprises that have hired militia officers and firemen employed by the state are failing to fulfill their contracts and to pay the necessary funds.

which may result in about 1,900 militiamen and 3,070 firemen not receiving their pay.

Minister Danov asked for a short-term loan from the Ministry of Finance but, according to what we were told by the Government Press Center, Minister Kostov refused. At its next meeting the government will discuss a decision that will oblige companies to make priority payments from their funds to the militia and fire brigade. The government is likely also to hold a closed meeting to discuss the Interior Ministry's financial problems in general.

'Ineffective' Precautions at Chernobyl Trial

AU3004093491 Sofia BTA in English 2220 GMT
29 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 29 (BTA)— "After the Chernobyl accident there was not a news blackout in Bulgaria, the proper name for what happened was a news crime," said one of the witnesses summoned to testify at the trial of two former top officials who were supposed to make arrangements for the radiological protection of the population. The trial is in its third week now. According to Professor Georgi Georgiev of the Institute of Nuclear Medicine, the problem is not that Bulgarians were not exposed to a threshold extent of contamination but that the precautions taken in Bulgaria proved to be absolutely ineffective. The situation in this country was quite different from that in the civilized world where the population received instructions to take some simple precautions.

Prof. Georgiev declared himself against a radiation scare, stressing that the average annual radiation exposure a Bulgarian gets from X-ray checks actually exceeds the doses received by the population after the Chernobyl accident.

An expert who was called to give evidence at the trial of Grigor Stoichkov, former chairman of the Governmental Commission for Management of Natural Disasters and Major Industrial Accidents, and of Prof. Lyubomir Shindarov, former sanitary inspector general, said that only nine of the 53 laboratories operating at that time were engaged in analyzing radiation levels.

Mr. Venelin Martinov, D.Sc. (agric.), produced facts to corroborate the statement made by another witness who said that it was mostly goods earmarked for export which were checked for radiation after the accident. About 45,000 tests were taken at the agricultural academy at that time, more than 24,000 of which on exports. One sample was

taken per nine tonnes of products destined for export, while with the goods going to the home market the rate of sampling was one per 300 tonnes of agricultural products. Ms. Zdravka Pechenikova, head of the commission of experts appointed at that time, expressed her and her colleagues' surprise with the data released by Prof. Shindarov and Mr. Pandev, former chairman of the Committee Uses of Atomic Energy, in a televised interview of May 7, 1986 and their reassuring tone. She said that experts were stunned when an announcement released on May 24, 1986 canceled all precautions.

The witnesses for the commission of experts who have testified so far now confirmed that there was no "feedback" from the Governmental Commission and that the latter did not take any stand on the recommendations made by the former. The witness Mr. Tseno Khinkovski, president of the Agricultural Academy, holds the same opinion.

Resumption of Zhivkov's Trial Uncertain

AU3004093091 Sofia BTA in English 2123 GMT
29 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 29 (BTA)—Ms. Stefanka Stoyanova, the presiding judge at the trial of Bulgaria's former No.1, Mr. Todor Zhivkov, cannot tell when the trial will end. Ten days ago Ministry of Interior hospital doctors prescribed Mr. Zhivkov a ten-day course of treatment at home to Mr. Zhivkov [sentence as published]. This period expired today.

In the middle of last week the panel of judges appointed a four-member expert medical commission who were to examine Mr. Zhivkov's health condition and say when Mr. Zhivkov would be able to reappear in court.

Ms. Stoyanova told BTA that she did not know whether the appointed medical experts—three of them from the army hospital and one from the hospital of the Ministry of the Interior—had received the court decision and that in most probability the expert examination would take place after the May day holiday.

One of Mr. Zhivkov's defense lawyers, Ms. Daniela Dokovska, declined to comment on her client's state of health.

A couple of days ago Mr. Krasimir Zhekov, 47, who appears for the prosecution in the Zhivkov-Balev case, told BTA he had the feeling he could retire on pension before the trial was over.

Public Against Violence Gives Regular Briefing

LD2904155991 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1330 GMT 29 Apr 91

[Text] At the regular briefing of Public Against Violence [VPN] in Bratislava today, its representatives confirmed that after the departure of the For a Democratic Slovakia platform, it is remaining a political movement of the middle.

It feels that solving the state legislative setup of Slovakia and its position within the framework of the federation and putting the economic transformation into motion are of primary importance.

VPN Coordinating Center Chairman Juraj Flamik said, on their further relation to the For a Democratic Slovakia platform, that it is not possible to speak about any joint (?work), as the For a Democratic Slovakia platform is declaring that it wants to become a constructive opposition.

He also said that the For a Democratic Slovakia platform refuses to pledge politically that it will not take steps to create pressure for shortening the period before elections.

Journalists also learned that the For a Democratic Slovakia platform is also envisaging the use of pressure methods—demonstrations and political strikes—which are, however, banned by law.

ZDS Issues Statement on Strikes, Elections

LD3004090591 Prague CTK in English 2223 GMT
29 Apr 91

[Text] Bratislava April 29 (CTK)—“The Club of VPN [Public Against Violence]-For Democratic Slovakia (ZDS) deputies in the Slovak parliament does not support the organisation of strikes with political goals, intended to pressure the use of constitutional power entrusted to legislative bodies,” said a statement obtained today by CTK.

The statement continues: “Information in the press about VPN-ZDS appeals for such strikes—especially for a general strike—is not founded in truth.

“Early elections are not an unusual form of resolving a conflict between public opinion and the composition of parliament in a parliamentary democracy. But the club of VPN-ZDS Slovak parliamentarians will not initiate calls for elections before the expiration of the electoral term in recognition of the fact that a constitutional law would be necessary to accept such a measure.

“The VPN-ZDS club of deputies will employ all constitutional means for promoting and supporting the interests of the general public.”

Carnogursky: Economic Reform Will Not Change

LD2904203791 Prague CTK in English 1935 GMT
29 Apr 91

[Text] Bratislava April 29 (CTK)—Slovak Premier Jan Carnogursky said today the economic reform programme underway in Slovakia should be updated to take into account the current economic conditions in the republic but will not be substantially changed.

At a press conference held after the first session of the new Slovak Government, Carnogursky said his Cabinet will have for the time being the same number of ministers as the previous one. “The original government programme adopted in July 1990 foresaw a gradual reduction in the size of the Cabinet but envisioned a more rapid process of privatisation and transition to a market-based economy”, he said.

Carnogursky replaced as premier Vladimir Meciar who was dismissed with another seven ministers in a Slovak Government reshuffle last week.

Carnogursky (Christian Democratic Movement), said “holding early parliamentary elections in Slovakia would not add to stability”. He said that in his view the present high popularity of Meciar’s VPN-[Public Against Violence]-For Democratic Slovakia (ZDS) will not last long.

Carnogursky denied reports that Meciar had been offered the post of deputy premier on the new Slovak Government.

However, he said, there are no objections to the participation of Meciar’s VPN-For Democratic Slovakia (ZDS) group in the government.

In response to reports that a general strike was being prepared in Slovakia for May 6, Carnogursky said this would represent a breach of the general agreement on the part of the workers. “My government would like to observe the principle that agreements are to be honoured”, he said, noting that the general agreement enumerates not only the government’s obligations but also those of the trade unions, such as that they should avoid strikes.

Vales on Future of Economic Reform in Slovakia

LD2604092191 Prague Federal 1 Television Network
in Czech 2015 GMT 25 Apr 91

[‘Excerpt’ from news conference by Deputy Federal Prime Minister Vaclav Vales with unidentified reporters; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Reporter] What is the view of the Federal Government about the further course of economic reform in Slovakia following the appointment of the new prime minister and the departure of Mr. Kucerak [Slovak deputy prime minister] from the Slovak Government?

[Vales] This question is difficult to answer as far as the consequences of the departure of Mr. Kucerak are concerned. It could be well answered only by the person who is going to replace him. It is well known that there are two very different streams concerning the assessment of the transformation process. This is not only from the point of view of the specific features of economic policy but, I would say, from the point of view of the nature of the transformation process itself. Nevertheless, this is only a preliminary view.

As far as the prime minister is concerned, I do not see any danger here as I think that Mr. Carnogursky is enough of a realist to be able to fully understand which possibilities are realistic. As far as I know, a certain consensus was reached before Mr. Kucerak was recalled that it is possible to continue the transformation process in Slovakia as well using different economic policy tools, but we keep stressing that this is the sphere in which to look for solutions [as heard]

If a bigger credit range is needed in Slovakia, it is not a change in the transformation. We have 60 or 45 billion [currency not specified] to place but we have not yet reached the credit ceiling, and we still have some room to maneuver. I have still not mentioned the possibility of using foreign credit. The situation in Slovakia is no doubt different, but it is not a change in the transformation process. It is a different thing if discussion of a different course—of a different tax system—arises, but not even Mr. Meciar's government has embarked on this.

Carnogursky Interviewed on First Days in Office

*LD2604165591 Bratislava Domestic Service
in Slovak 1100 GMT 26 Apr 91*

[Studio interview with Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky by Lubomir Litner in Bratislava on 26 April—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Litner] Mr. Prime Minister, it is not even 100 hours since your appointment. Most of them have been spent in the legislature. Have you already been asked to carry out any action as new prime minister?

[Carnogursky] Yes. When we were in the Slovak National Council [SNR], demonstrators started to literally besiege the Council building. They broke the wooden door, and therefore I had to make a decision about using the police, who pushed them away from the building. I hope that the citizens noticed that the police tried to keep its necessary interference to a minimum yet sufficient amount to guarantee the smooth running of the SNR, because such a guarantee is a responsibility of the government.

[Litner] I wanted to ask something else on this point. How is it that there was a wide enough gap for the citizens to get to the building?

[Carnogursky] There were blocks around the building that were smaller than those prescribed by law to be used during the assembly of citizens, but the demonstrators—or the undisciplined among them—removed those blocks.

[Litner] The word democracy has been used over and over again in the last few days. You are a representative of the group that came to power at a time when many laws were not observed or were evaded. The citizens remember November 1989 very well. Now many people really adhere to every letter of the law. Citizens are telling themselves that yet again what is important is a power struggle and not democracy. How would you explain the difference?

[Carnogursky] I want to formulate power, democracy, and freedom in one sentence. I think that so far we have been successful in doing this.

[Litner] The session of the SNR has also shown that deputies have their own ideas on democracy and apply them in their own way. What we have seen from the events in the SNR has revealed many things. What surprised you most in last few days regarding the SNR?

[Carnogursky] I think that the SNR session was not as bad as some journalists think. It has been shown that our voting technique is not that great. Also, one deputy—former minister Kosta—concluded consequences from his behavior, something that some others deputies did not do [as heard]. [passage omitted]

[Litner] I think that in Slovakia we should try for a sort of unison. What do you think?

[Carnogursky] Yes, the government will strive for this.

[Litner] Let us remember the split in Slovak society; you said this in your first speech as prime minister. What do you want to do to overcome this split as well as—let us hide nothing—the aversion against your person? What do you think will be the greatest obstacle?

[Carnogursky] I think that the greatest obstacles will be in understanding and estimating to what extent economic problems, which are inevitably ahead of us, are caused by us or are not caused by us, or to put it in other words, to what extent we could have avoided them and to what extent we could not. That will be a problem. The new government wants to overcome this problem by telling the truth.

[Litner] Since you mentioned the economy, you will recall that 10 days ago, the Slovak Government did not endorse the report submitted on economic reform. The SNR voiced no confidence in its presenter, Jozef Kucerak, but you were defending him at the plenum. Does this then mean that you are going to submit the same proposal to the reshuffled government?

[Carnogursky] No, we are not. After all, the government has made a decision—and this decision is in force—and

has instructed Minister Filkus to draw up new material. This instruction is in force, and he must submit a new proposal. [passage omitted]

[Litner] It was acutally thanks to the disagreements within the Public Against Violence [VPN] that you got to the pinnacle of government power. Do you think that it is possible to transfer into the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] certain disagreements—the internal disagreements, since, after all, they were originated by people—or are you able to preserve the certain monolithic nature of your movement?

[Carnogursky] I think we can preserve this nature. So far we have in fact managed to preserve it. You see, during the past nine months since the elections, there were periods when the disagreements between the KDH and VPN were considerable. Due to circumstances, the KDH and the VPN are now pulling on the same rope. The fulcrum of disagreements is shifting and changing, and we must adapt and come to terms with this fact. [passage omitted]

[Litner] I would like to know your real view regarding the fact that the government was unable to function because of Vladimir Meciar.

[Carnogursky] I think that he bears the biggest share of blame.

[Litner] How will you operate as prime minister? Will you avoid certain characteristic feaures—those that Meciar was blamed for? Was his lack of communication and his lack of collective attitude really as bad as was said by his opponents?

[Carnogursky] This was not so in case of my own communication with him. Our mutual communication was good, but his communication with some government members from the VPN did not in fact exist, and if it did it was negative. [passage omitted]

[Litner] I hope we will meet again in a week's time.

[Carnogursky] I hope so, too.

Gal Comments on Change in Prime Minister's Post

LD2704081391 Bratislava Domestic Service
in Slovak 1705 GMT 26 Apr 91

[Interview with Public Against Violence Chairman Fedor Gal by editor Marta Vancova; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Vancova] Mr. Gal, why did you not put a Public Against Violence [VPN] member in the vacated post of prime minister? Why did you pass over the election victory to the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]?

[Gal] Ask Mr. Meciar why, by causing the split in VPN that won the legislative elections, he brought about a

situation whereby the KDH is today the strongest political force on the Slovak political scene.

[Vancova] I do not agree with your mathematics there, because the KDH is possibly—although I doubt it a little—the strongest political movement in the legislature, but not on the Slovak political scene. Civic Forum [OF] has also split, I believe, and into three streams in fact, but they have not handed over their victory?

[Gal] The division of OF, though it was dramatic, took place up to the last moment in a legitimate and legal manner. The division or differentiation of OF took place there at the last minute on the legal basis of a Civic Forum assembly. We, on the other hand, still have to reach such an agreement on Saturday at the VPN congress. However, the For a Democratic Slovakia platform [ZDS] already exists, has officially gone into opposition, has officially reacted, for example, to the post of deputy prime minister for economic reform. [passage omitted]

[Vancova] VPN's biggest reservations were about Mr. Meciar in person. Now the new prime minister is a man who, in my view, is even more noteworthy for the sins with which you reproached Mr. Meciar. Could you tell us what your main reservations were?

[Gal] You are telling me that Jan Carnogursky has become the Slovak prime minister, and he has even more of the same shortcomings than former Slovak Prime Minister Meciar. What is yur basis for saying that?

Our main reservation about Mr. Meciar was that the government was unable to function properly. That cannot be said about Jan Carnogursky, because he is only just starting as prime minister, so we will have to wait and see whether his government will be more able to function or not. I am convinced that it will be more able to function properly.

[Vancova] But if I may say so, Mr. Carnogursky was first deputy prime minister of that same government that was unable to function properly, and as I see it, one individual cannot be held responsible for a collective body.

[Gal] Yes, but every collective body has its leader, and the leader of that collective body was Prime Minister Meciar. Jan Carnogursky will be the leader of the new body. Secondly, Jan Carnogursky has not yet been reproached by anyone for misleading the public with false statements. No one has reproached him for saying that he had brought back 100,000 jobs from Bavaria or the Soviet Union for our jobless. Do you know something? I know what the German press has been saying about these comments. They disagree very strongly with them, but you journalists pick up these remarks and publish them. It is not true that there were any such opportunities, and there are lots of comments of this kind. I hope that these too will be discussed at the 13th meeting of the Slovak legislature. No one has reproached Jan Carnogursky for manipulating confidential information, with publicly condemning screenings and then ordering screenings to be carried out, with abusing

confidential information of this kind—data from security files—for political purposes. [passage omitted]

[Vancova] Let us leave that matter there, because now I would like to ask you about the cushioning of economic reform. I heard Mr. Jan Carnogursky say on television that it was vital to strengthen the role of the state in pushing through the economic reform, and you yourself know the KDH's alternative economic reform scenario—this is the second point on which people object to you handing over the election victory to that movement.

[Gal] Well once again I must say that it was the ZDS that handed it over by undermining VPN as the single integrated political movement that won the parliamentary elections—that is the first thing. Secondly, do not imagine that we are sitting on our backsides watching the world go by. In the last few days, I have had a number of very fundamental talks with representatives of the KDH, and we share the view that there can be no alternative economic reform concept, but that the economic policies deriving from it can have different forms, and they need to be discussed. We have to make up our minds whether we want to shoot the economic reform dead, slow it down, totally transform its nature, or whether we only want to incorporate into the notion of the economic reform certain features that respect the real socioeconomic conditions in which it is being implemented. At the moment, the KDH's alternative is a proposal for a sort of nuance in the understanding of the concept of economic reform; they do not want to replace it by a different alternative. Let me say quite clearly that at this moment I believe that if the economic reform concept were to fail, then that would be the end of our dream for a healthy society. Do you understand?

[Vancova] I would like to ask you about the accumulation of power—not in one set of hands, but certainly within one family.

[Gal] I do not like the accumulation of power; it seems to me that the accumulation of power...[changes thought] Here I am not talking about a family, because one brother can work in the legislature and the other in the government, and that does not mean the accumulation of power in one set of hands, in one head, in one place, because the legislature has the primary function of controlling power and it is a collective body, it contains many people, and those people have the opportunity to correct the views of a single person; the same applies in the case of the government. The fact is that the post of prime minister is an important one, and what I protest against is the power of a leader of a movement, the strongest movement following the legislative elections, being concentrated in the hands of a prime minister. Let me add this: The problem of accumulation of power is a special one under our conditions. We have our historical experience, and only 16 months have passed since the debacle of decades of a persistent monopoly of power by one political party. That is why I am fearful of the accumulation of power, but I know at the same time that in normal, well-established democracies it is a matter of

course that the leader of the victorious party can take the role of prime minister. However, we are really such a young and fragile democracy, and that is another reason why I am fearful of the accumulation of power, and I do not take back even a single letter—indeed I have the feeling that events have borne out what I said.

[Vancova] But Mr. Jan Carnogursky is the leader of a movement and you yourself said a moment ago that it is the strongest movement on the Slovak political scene?

[Gal] But I also said before that the power was put into the hands of Jan Carnogursky and the KDH by the ZDS platform and the split in VPN, and I told you my view; I did not tell you the view of the KDH and Jan Carnogursky, do you understand?

[Vancova] Mr. Gal, you constantly stress that the election victory was handed over to the KDH by the ZDS platform. Are you in VPN prepared to concede, even a little, that you made a mistake?

[Gal] Look, you like to make your own comments on events, I do not take that away from you because it is your right as a journalist. We are aware that we have made mistakes, just as other political groups have, because everyone makes mistakes, but I think that at this moment it is generally good that responsibility for resolving the social problems that have arisen should be borne by other political groupings than VPN, and for two reasons. First because we are truly tired out, weary, and at the end of our rope since November, and we need to take stock of what has happened, unite our people, draw up a concept of individual steps up to the legislative elections and after them, and resolve our internal conflicts. We cannot do all that at the same time. Second, I do not feel that we are unwilling to engage in dialogue, because the very day on which the ZDS platform came into being and then several times since then too, we suggested meetings and having a dialogue with Prime Minister Meciar, but no such meeting took place until the last few days. The truth is that yesterday, the day before, and even before that, we sat down with ZDS representatives to seek ways of giving that platform legitimacy. Let me tell you quite honestly and briefly: I would personally very much like to see the ZDS platform exist as a legitimate political group and become independent as soon as possible.

Weiss Sees Meciar's Recall as Conspiracy

AU2904130591 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
25 Apr 91 p 2

[CTK report: "How Prague and Budapest Have Prevailed"]

[Text] Bratislava—Some journalists—journalists from the Czech Republic in particular— have been asking about the meaning of the statement made to CTK by Petr Weiss, chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left: "At the Slovak National Council [SNR] Presidium,

the policies of Prague and Budapest have momentarily prevailed. Now, it is Bratislava's turn". Peter Weiss said:

"It is no secret that some Slovak political representatives have literally been besmirched—even with the help of some political representatives—in the Prague mass media for a long time. It is impossible not to remember various statements—statements that very often went beyond the framework of political culture—targeted upon those Slovak politicians who were recalled from the government yesterday. As an example, I will mention the unjustified and offending allegations concerning the leftist coup, national socialism, and the well-known statement made by Federal Government Minister Baksay about Prime Minister Meciar's early recall. In this context—and also in the context of the new wave of vigorously calling the jurisdiction bill into question as happened, for example, in the Federal Government report on the economic situation in the CSFR—yesterday's decision by the SNR Presidium cannot be perceived in any other way than as a victory of those Prague political and journalistic circles who, for a long time, have doggedly been after Meciar's fall. Is it unusual that many of our citizens believe that—instead of discussing the ability of the government to function in the SNR—all these matters were agreed upon at meetings in Prague?

"Apropos Budapest: Of course, not only the former prime minister's differences and exchanges of views with some political and journalist circles in Budapest—and not only his unequivocal opinion that there was a political background to the dispute about the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros hydro project—are involved here. Something else, too, is involved here.

"We remember the way in which the restitution bill was born. We remember how deputies from the Hungarian Independent Initiative [MNI], from the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH], and from Együttélés - Coexistence were persuaded to support the vote by a Civic Forum promise that a specific solution [to the restitution law] will be pushed for in Slovakia. This solution would move the restitution deadline to before 25 February 1948 and—in many specific cases—this would not involve transferring the state's ownership rights to individuals but would involve a violation of ownership relations between individuals and transferring their ownership rights to other owners.

"Interests always prevail in politics. Is it illogical and inadmissible to think that an agreement could have been concluded according to which controversial questions would be solved in exchange for MNI, MKDH, and Coexistence's support in the reshuffling of the government and in blocking the asked-for reshuffling in the SNR Presidium?

"Finally, is it really necessary to be too clever to be able to ask whether movement on the Slovak Republic political scene is not connected with the search for a compromise in the matter of the Adria oil pipeline, which

NARODNA OBRODA wrote about on 22 April and, in conclusion, stated that everyone is kicking an underdog?

"Positive reactions in the Hungarian Republic's press regarding Meciar's recall testify to the fact that there is a sense of victory.

"Apropos Bratislava: the reconstruction of the SNR—based on proportional representation, as already requested by some opposition parties during the first SNR session—will be a triumph of democracy."

Meciar, Carnogursky 'Handshake' Called For

*AU2904142991 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA
in Slovak 25 Apr 91 p 5*

[Jan Fuele commentary: "A Missing Handshake"]

[Text] Surrounding the Slovak National Council [SNR] building is becoming a sort of national pastime. Thanks to this, the deputies have had to—on more than one occasion—leave the Slovak legislature by side exits. Despite such experiences, several of them—along with my journalist colleagues—decided to use the main entrance yesterday morning. Later someone called the narrow passageway through the metal barriers a street of shame. In the press center afterwards we chatted—with a smile—about the names those standing around the barriers called us. At the same time, we formulated our plans for escape.

Perhaps this is an unusual introduction to a commentary on recent events. I hope, however, it more realistically characterizes the situation in which the deputies again found themselves. The SNR Presidium decided to recall Vladimir Meciar from the post of prime minister the day before yesterday, and that was really a step which—in the words of Frantisek Miklosko—"was taken regardless of what will happen tomorrow." Tomorrow was yesterday.

Following his mollifying television address—marked by a rather transparent trick in which he exhibited the reading device—Jan Carnogursky delivered his first speech to the deputies yesterday. He certainly caused a surprise about one thing—he rid himself of the long-formed image that he is striving for autonomy and, thus, for Slovakia's isolation. The new Slovak prime minister spoke anxiously about the unpleasant reports published by the foreign press and also about the domestic and international isolation that threatens Slovakia. At the same time, as the number one Slovak politician, he at least mentioned the possible drawback of early parliamentary elections.

It is just a pity that the deputies did not grant Vladimir Meciar and his supporters from the platform—Milan Knazko and Roman Zelenay—an opportunity to speak. Now one can only assume what the tone of their prepared speeches will be like. On the day he was appointed,

Jan Carnogursky held talks with the former prime minister and said that they could be regarded as almost friendly. SNR deputies are probably not interested in a theatrical performance indicating an act of goodwill, but if the former prime minister were to shake hands with the new one in the legislature, we in Slovakia could be spared more than one strike alert and demonstration. If Vladimir Meciar, as he has promised, returns to politics, the shadow of his, for the moment, last public statement—in which he did not speak very flatteringly, which is at variance with his previous speeches about cooperation with his former deputy—would not hang over him. However, a handshake is missing not only in this make-believe isolated case. There are angry people on the streets who are probably also thinking about something else at the moment.

Pithart on State Treaty, Possible Separation

AU2604140091 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
22 Apr 91 p 2

[Interview with Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart by Jaroslav Veis and Jiri Hanak; place and date not given: "There is Nothing To Take Anything From"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [LIDOVE NOVINY] Mr. Pithart, a few days ago in Cheb you said that two republics that are able to function are better than one republic that is unable to function. Your other statements that your Slovak colleagues perceive the proposed state treaty in a psychological rather than in a legal manner—and that this problem could be discussed on this basis—were in contradiction to this. Does this mean that another Trencianske Teplice meeting [at which constitutional matters were discussed] is being prepared?

[Pithart] I do not know what you mean by the term "new Trencianske Teplice." This sounds like a "new Munich." When I met with Slovak political officials, the fact that the concept for the state treaty was not satisfactorily precise from the legal point of view struck me. When we objected that, from the strictly legal point of view, this treaty was unrealistic—above all, because it literally puts the Federal Assembly aside and assumes an artificial disruption of the federation's continuity—the Slovak partners responded that we do not have to take it so literally and that if we really want we should be able to find a solution because it is only a purely technical problem. I did not understand this well. Only later, from one statement made by Slovak National Council Chairman Miklosko—when he said that the Slovak need for a state treaty was more of a psychological than a legal nature—did it become clear to me that they did not really want a state treaty in the strict legal sense of this word, but that they wanted a treaty that would not only be symbolic, yet, on the other hand, a treaty that would not necessarily mean that we would have to do what we do not want to do, that is, disrupt the federations' continuity and put the Federal Assembly out of business. If this is the truth, then we have greater scope [for

negotiation] than previously anticipated, and it is possible to imagine a treaty, or an agreement, between representatives of both nations—let us say between all the Slovak Republic deputies and all the Czech Republic deputies, irrespective of whether they were elected to the National Council or to the Federal Assembly. I also said in Cheb that we would be willing to discuss this question in detail only if it would become apparent beforehand that we would not be laying foundations for a federation that is not able to function. A federation that is unable to function is a federation that has relinquished to its parts—that is to the republics—such powers as would negate what is important for an economic transformation, that is, equal and equitable conditions for all. Here, the reader may certainly recall slogans that are frequently used in Slovakia—slogans pertaining to specific Slovak conditions. The goal is obvious: To define, once again, special conditions for selected regions, sectors, and enterprises. This, however, is exactly what we want to abandon, that is, the directive system of management in which special rules are set out in the plan for each enterprise—and for each of its units—instructing them about what material and how much of it to consume, what to manufacture and for whom, that is, simply put, planning. Under such conditions it was, as a matter of principle, impossible to tell who is good and who is bad. Just because each [entity] was operating according to different rules. Since it was impossible to find out who was bad, it turned out finally that all of us were bad. No return to these "rules" that were tailored to everyone's needs is possible. Should there be no unified economy—that would implement reform with equal toughness or softness—then there would be no sense in speculating about treaties, agreements, accords, and pacts that would lead to such a state. This is what I said quite clearly in Cheb. If our Slovak partners insist on a strictly legal agreement, then it would be for us—from the legal and logical points of view—unacceptable nonsense. It would also be unacceptable nonsense if they wanted to find a form [of agreement] that would revive [konvalidovat] (Editorial note: a legal transformation of an invalid legal act into a valid one) the somewhat problematic treaties concluded in Pittsburgh and Cleveland, or if they wanted to revive the Kosice Program [of 1945] or the [law on] the federation enacted in 1968—which, in fact, enacts a would-be federation. Yet, if we wanted to find something that would replace all these problematic and, in fact, not-respected treaties by something that would be a manifestation of the will of representatives of the Slovak nation, then I would not see anything wrong in it.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] It is rumored that the Czech Government is working on some variant for an independent economic—and, of course, political—development. Is this true?

[Pithart] Yes. I am of the opinion that a combination of both methods could lead to an acceptable compromise. At the same time, we will matter-of-factly, without sentimentality, without reproaches, and without recrimination prepare ourselves for the division of the state—if

it takes place. This means that we will have prepared a scenario for taking the first, second, and third steps, and a scenario for the government to know what to do in the first hours, what to do at the end of the first week, and what it will be necessary to do during the first month. That is, the businesslike preparation for a possible crisis situation and permanent willingness to negotiate will mean no blackmail, no pressure, and no ultimatums from the Slovak side. I believe that by combining these methods we could see it through.

Pithart Opposes Tripartite Federation

*AU2904140591 Prague CTK in English 2046 GMT
24 Apr 91*

[Text] Prague April 24 (CTK)—Czech Premier Petr Pithart said in the Czech National Council (parliament) here today economic reform, not the republic's future constitutional and territorial setup, is the most pressing issue for the Czech Republic, the smaller of Czechoslovakia's two constituent republics.

Pithart said Slovak and Moravian demands that their specific regional conditions be taken into account pose a threat to the economic reform program. The Czech Government views the decentralization of state administration as the starting point for the constitutional and territorial setup of the Czech Republic. Municipal government must be the first level of state administration, Pithart said.

The Czech Government believes it is not possible for the time being for Czechoslovakia to become a tripartite federation as the Slovak side was taken by surprise by this proposal. "Slovak politicians frequently change their minds and hold contradictory views. The Slovak political scene is currently chaotic."

Pithart said Moravia (the eastern part of the Czech Republic) is not a constitutional entity. Therefore it is not clear how many parts a Czechoslovak federation would have. Pithart said to insist on a tripartite federation could now block the drafting of federal, Czech, and Slovak constitutions.

Czech National Council Passes Privatization Law

*AU2904113191 Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech
24 Apr 91 p 1*

["(mag)"]-signed report: "YES to Large-Scale Privatization"]

[Text] Prague—The 18th successive Czech National Council [CNR] session—which will debate the constitutional and legal arrangement—began in Prague yesterday. This most-awaited issue, however, should come onto the plenum's agenda today. Therefore, it is rumored that Moravians will come to demonstrate in front of the CNR building.

Meanwhile, the Czech legislature approved a government draft CNR law on so-called large-scale privatization, on the conduct and activity of Czech Republic bodies in matters connected with transferring property belonging to the state to other persons, and on the National Property Fund. T. Jezek, Czech minister for the administration of national property and its nationalization, gave the details on the law. According to the law, this ministry will safeguard the organizational aspect; the transfer of state property into private ownership is the Fund's task. In practice, the issue in transferring property should not only involve the auction and coupon method, but should also involve other kinds of selling and restitution.

One of the few amendments—which was finally adopted—was submitted by J. Petr (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia). According to this amendment, within one month after the law comes into effect (it comes into effect the day it is announced), the Czech Government will publish a list of those enterprises that—for a period of at least five years—will not be affected by large-scale privatization. However, all but one of the Communist deputies were, in the end, against adopting the entire law, or they abstained in the vote.

The CNR later began to debate the draft law on communities' property proposed by Czech Finance Minister K. Spacek. This law should concern the more than 5,700 communities to whom 20-25 percent of the overall current value of state property (500-700 billion korunas) will accrue. The deputies divided into two camps in an extensive debate. They divided into those who do not believe in the "autonomy" of communities and their representatives and those who supported the law's adoption, albeit with comments. At press time, the debate was still in progress.

CNR Sets Up Economic Competition Office

*LD2604140291 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1100 GMT 26 Apr 91*

[Text] The 18th session of the Czech National Council [CNR] has entered its fourth day today. Regarding the fact that the work on the draft resolution on the constitutional and territorial setup of the Czech Republic has not been completed, deputies decided at the beginning of the session to change the agenda. In the morning, deputies endorsed the government-sponsored bill on the establishment of a Czech office for economic competition [Cesky urad pro hospodarskou soutez], which, as a central body of state administration, should create conditions for the protection of economic competition and prevent the emergence and maintenance of monopolies. The Czech National Council also relieved 12 professional judges from their duties. The plenum then endorsed the nominations of 19 new judges in the Czech Republic.

CNR Passes Resolution on Principles

*LD2704084491 Prague CTK in English 1940 GMT
26 Apr 91*

[Text] Prague April 26 (CTK)—The Czech National Council [CNR] (parliament) passed today a resolution laying down principles which it considers necessary for the future constitutional setup in Czechoslovakia.

"The constitutional setup is based on the regional and civic principle: it is necessary to respect the specificities of the Czech lands (Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia) and Slovakia: the federal laws are superior to the laws of its members: these principles must be accepted by all members of the federation", the resolution said.

The resolution also recommends to the federal parliament that the future Czechoslovak constitution should not include provisions which might hinder possible changes in the constitutional setup and says that a multipartite federation is acceptable.

Havel Views Talks With Parties on Constitutions

*LD2904190991 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1630 GMT 29 Apr 91*

[Text] Stanislav Benda has brought us a report on the regular briefing by Presidential Press Spokesman Michael Zantovsky.

[Benda] President Vaclav Havel and his press spokesman answered questions today. Thus, naturally, the briefing was longer than usual, lasting nearly an hour. Therefore I have chosen only one topical reply for you concerning the change in the office of the Slovak prime minister and whether this will reflect on the process of drafting new constitutions. The president said:

[Begin Havel recording] I do not think that this will have any decisive influence on the talks. Nevertheless, I should sum up the talks so far because there are occasionally misunderstandings as to why some parties are being invited and others are not. The idea is quite clear: before legislative clubs and committees and the legislature itself discuss it—I mean the constitution or various steps that will precede the adoption of the constitution—it must be discussed at a political level by representatives from various parties and movements.

Our timetable is as follows: First of all, we have been and still are talking with delegates of political forces that are represented in the Federal Government coalition. This will be followed by joint deliberations of all these political forces, as well as political forces also represented at republican level in government coalitions. This means the People's Party in the Czech land and the Democratic Party in Slovakia; so far, the issue of how the For a Democratic Slovakia platform will be represented remains open. It has declared on the one hand that it is in opposition, but on the other hand it has two ministers in the government. This will have to be resolved somehow.

If the talks that we are conducting with those political coalition forces reach some specific result, then naturally this will be followed by political talks with other parties represented in legislatures. This is quite clear. There is a certain hope emerging that some progress will be made at those talks.

In the course of previous talks—those held in the Vikarka restaurant and others that took place later—[former] Prime Minister Meciar took a constructive approach. I believe that the change of prime minister should not in any fundamental way influence these talks. [end recording]

[Benda] In later replies, Vaclav Havel focused in detail on the future treaty between the CSFR and the Soviet Union. He also answered a question concerning our strategy on arms exports. In his opinion, our country has never declared that it will stop making weapons at once or will immediately stop their export. It only stated that it will carry out conversion of the military industry and will not export offensive weapons to crisis-ridden areas. There is, therefore, no reason for us not to sell, for example, tanks already produced to areas where there is no threat of war and use the profits from this transaction for the conversion of the arms industry.

We also learned at the briefing that Vaclav Havel will meet representatives of the federation tomorrow at a further meeting devoted to the drafting of new constitutions. You will, no doubt, also be interested to know that on 5 May from 1000 to 1700 Prague Castle state function rooms will be opened to the public.

Havel on Czech, Slovak 'Equal Relationship'

*LD2904133291 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1200 GMT 29 Apr 91*

[Text] At a news conference in Prague Castle today President Vaclav Havel expressed the view, among other things, that the Czechs will have to get used to the fact that there are two partners in the federation. He also said the Czech nation had in the past for many reasons a greater influence on Czechoslovak politics than the Slovak nation. For this reason too, the Czechs might consider on many occasions, on the basis of previous experience, the seeking of the equal relationship—which is often complicated and painful—as Slovak blackmail and pressurizing [as heard]. To establish an equal relationship is a matter of agreement of both partners. Ideas about a confederative setup, a federation of three nations, or a federation of a greater number of countries were described by the president as interesting. He, however, admitted that Czechoslovakia is not ripe yet for such a radical interference in the setup of the whole state.

Vales Denies 'Major Differences' Over Economy*LD2604093691 Prague CTK in English 2205 GMT
25 Apr 91*

[Text] Prague April 25 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Deputy Premier Vaclav Vales told journalists today that trade with the Soviet Union has improved recently.

Speaking after a Cabinet session he estimated that the amount of goods worth 4,000-5,000 million dollars that the Czechoslovak Government feared would remain unsold on the Soviet market this year will be reduced by at least 1,000 million. (Marketing problems started between former Soviet bloc states after they switched to trade for foreign currency at the beginning of this year.)

Vales denied the existence of major differences between government deputy premiers and ministers responsible for the economy, as reported in the press. The allegations about disunity had been attributed to Deputy Premier Pavel Rychetsky. In response, Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus and Economics Minister Vladimir Dlouhy had suggested Rychetsky should resign. Vales said however there was no reason for him to do so.

None of the four—Vales, Rychetsky, Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus and Economics Minister Vladimir Dlouhy—has concluded that the process of economic transformation should be altered in any way and they fully support the line that has been taken, Vales said.

Vales said agreement on the economic reform was also evident at today's Cabinet session which discussed further economic policy. He announced that the government is undertaking a new economic analysis and will extend its dialogue with the Czech and Slovak Governments. A better knowledge of macroeconomic considerations may prevent misunderstandings often caused by the different conditions in the two republics. There are differences and they may be the reason for a change of economic policy but not for interventions against the macroeconomic instruments, Vales said.

IMF Satisfied With Economic Development*AU2904112791 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in
Slovak
24 Apr 91 p 1*

["(si)"]-signed report: "One-Sided Satisfaction"]

[Text] Bratislava—Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Jozef Kucerak received an official IMF mission yesterday. The objective of the visit to the CSFR is to evaluate whether the criteria resulting from the Declaration on Economic Policy (the so-called IMF memorandum) are being met.

As the deputy prime minister stressed at the conclusion of the talks, no strict check on whether the terms are being met or on whether figures in individual items are being respected was involved. The mission was more of a consultative nature, and it was searching for ways to assist the Czechoslovak economy. Its members studied

the problems faced by our enterprises and caused by the disintegration of CEMA markets. They expressed the opinion that, within the framework of privatization and the creation of the National Property Fund, the government should consider the possibility of helping them with eliminating their debts. They were critical about the fact that the fuel and energy price increases that were to be introduced as of 1 January 1991—and that should include compensations—have not been implemented. They were also interested in problems pertaining to unemployment. Even if the number of unemployed is high in our view, it is at an acceptable level compared to other countries to which the IMF has granted loans in recent years. They also expressed their positive opinion on the social safety net.

Other reasons for satisfaction are the relative stabilization of the inflation rate—which began after February this year—and also development in the balance of income and expenses in the Slovak Republic's budget.

Figures for Foreign Trade in 1990 Summarized*AU2604130291 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
22 Apr 91 p 6*

["(ks)"]-signed report: "Our Foreign Trade in 1990"]

[Text] Last year Czechoslovakia conducted trade with 148 states. Fifty of our largest partners were involved in almost 95 percent of exports and 97 percent of imports. The volume of foreign trade declined by 7.7 percent; this decline was caused, first and foremost, by a significant slump in trade involving nonconvertible currency (approximately 13 percent). The proportion of trading partners with market economies increased—in overall turnover—from 46.5 percent in 1989 to 49.6 percent in 1990.

In particular, imports of raw materials (oil) declined along with our exports (by 11.6 percent). Overall, our balance of payments was in the red more than at any time since 1977.

The Soviet Union has remained our number one trading partner. However, its share of trade has fallen from 41.6 percent in 1988 to 23.2 percent. The united Germany occupies second place with almost 20 percent. Third is Austria, fourth is Poland, and fifth is Hungary. Yugoslavia and Switzerland are in sixth and seventh place. Great Britain, placed eighth, has overtaken ninth placed China, and Italy is in tenth place.

Following German reunification, the proportion of trade with European Community countries amounts to 31.5 percent.

Czechoslovakia's trade in armaments has significantly declined. Last year it accounted for only 4.6 percent of exports and 3.1 percent of imports.

New Christian Social Movement Established

AU2904111591 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
24 Apr 91 p 3

[CTK report: "New Christian Platform; Social Dimension"]

[Text] Prague—Dissatisfaction with the social policy of the Czechoslovak People's Party [CSL] and the Christian Democratic Party has made representatives of the Democratic Movement of Christians and the Christian Social Movement unite in the newly established Christian Social Movement [Krestanskosocialni hnuti]. The original Christian Social Movement was formed on the platform of the CSL. The Democratic Movement of Christians was an informal association of Christian-minded citizens of all churches. The two groups have several thousand supporters, including several deputies to the Federal Assembly and the Czech National Council.

Havel Against Joining Anti-Soviet Alliance

LD2904164891 Prague CTK in English 1603 GMT
29 Apr 91

[Text] Prague April 29 (CTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel said today Czechoslovakia does not want to join any alliance directed against the Soviet Union.

At a briefing here, Havel said the prepared new Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty could be concluded for a period of 15 years. Referring to three contentious articles of the treaty, he said there was hope of reaching a consensus on two of them. In the third article the USSR proposes that neither of the parties to the treaty should enter into any security alliance directed against the other side during the treaty's validity. Havel said this wording was unacceptable as it restricts the sovereignty of Czechoslovak decisions for a long time and it is a question who will judge whether an alliance is directed against the other side.

Havel recalled Czechoslovakia's intention to become sooner or later a member of the European Community which is planning a political union that will include the security factor.

Referring to Czechoslovak armaments exports, Havel said that Czechoslovak tanks can be exported if they have already been manufactured or are nearing completion and if a country is found where they can be exported without any political risks.

Commenting on developments in Slovakia, Havel noted that the parliamentary mechanism triumphed there last week. He praised the Slovak parliament for insisting on its decisions even though demonstrators were breaking the windows of the parliament building.

Slovakia (population five million) forms together with the Czech Republic (population ten million) federal Czechoslovakia. A chronic internal political crisis, caused by the split of the strongest Slovak parliamentary force, the Public Against Violence (VPN) movement, into "VPN" and "VPN-for Democratic Slovakia (ZDS)", culminated in Slovakia last week. Because of the improper functioning of the Slovak Government, the Slovak National Council (parliament) Presidium recalled Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar (VPN-ZDS) and seven ministers from their posts. Jan Carnogursky (KDH) was appointed new Slovak premier.

Havel said that certain unrest will persist in Slovakia. In his opinion, the demands for early elections, raised by some VPN-ZDS officials, and their inclination to extra-parliamentary methods of action are signs that the rules of the game, characteristic of parliamentary democracy, are being questioned.

Havel said the changes in the Slovak Government would not have any basic effect on talks about a new Czechoslovak constitution. The new federal Czech and Slovak constitutions are to be adopted by the next parliamentary elections, due next year, at the latest.

Referring to the demands of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) in Slovakia for a state treaty between the Czech and Slovak Republics, Havel spoke of efforts of the Czech side to comply with these demands. In his opinion, the Czechs must get used to the fact that there are two partners in the Czechoslovak federation. He believes that an equal relationship must be found, and added that Czechs used to have a bigger influence than Slovaks as they outnumber them and the centre of the federation (Prague) is on their territory.

Deputies Begin Working in Council of Europe

AU2804143291 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 23 Apr 91 pp 1, 15

[Jana Havligerova report: "A Democratic Forum"]

[Excerpts] Czechoslovakia was dominant in the Palace of Europe in Strasbourg yesterday. The personality of the day during the 43d regular Council of Europe session was Alexander Dubcek. [passage omitted]

The following members of our parliamentary delegation—the first ever from the CSFR—began working in the Council's political groups and committees yesterday: Deputies Jaroslav Cuhra (Christian Democratic Union); Karol Gemesi (Public Against Violence [VPN] movement); Jan Kobylka (Civic Forum); Vladimir Mikan (Civic Forum); Vlasta Parkanova (Civic Forum); Gabriela Rothmayerova (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia-Party of the Democratic Left); Frantisek Sebej (VPN); and Ivan Simko (Christian Democratic Movement). [passage omitted]

Smallholders Discuss 'Scandalous' Board Session*LD2904132291 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1000 GMT 29 Apr 91*

[Text] Over the weekend, though at a rather incomplete board session of the Smallholders Party [FKGP], Jozsef Torgyan was elected cochairman of the party. It cannot yet be known exactly whether the number of deputies at the session was enough for a valid election, or whether those without the right to vote voted. It cannot be known, either, how the parliamentary group of Smallholders evaluate the election held under debatable circumstances. Gabor Kereszti provides some pieces of filtered news.

[Kereszti] No group split can be expected today. The FKGP deputies are analyzing the national board session held under scandalous circumstances on Saturday, and will presumably state their views in the form of a statement at the plenary session in the afternoon. The question is whether the group regards the circumstances for the election of Jozsef Torgyan as cochairman as legitimate. The deputies have not yet taken a stance on this. A political battle is going on in there, one of them said.

According to a well-informed source, if it came to a group split after all, about 30 from the parliamentary group of 44 members would join Ferenc Jozsef Nagy—which means that the rest, 14, would join Jozsef Torgyan. It is worth mentioning here that at the group leader election three weeks ago Torgyan received 21 votes. Regarding the group leader post Gyula Pasztor, present leader, said earlier than he would stay in the post only until the national board session, but the party. In connection with the session on Saturday many people reckon that this has indeed taken place. However, Gyula Pasztor is at present staying abroad; no change of group leader can be expected today, either.

New Work Permit To Reduce 'Economic Refugees'*LD2904140891 Budapest MTI in English 1025 GMT
29 Apr 91*

[Text] Budapest, April 29, 1991 (MTI-Econews)—An interministerial committee consisting of representatives of the Hungarian Ministries of Labour, Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs are considering bringing in new legal regulations to tackle the refugee problem.

Under the new system, foreigners wanting to work here would, in future, have to apply for a work permit at the Hungarian Embassy or consulate in their own country, rather than after arrival in Hungary, which is the system at the moment. Lajos Pal, senior official at the Legal Department of the Ministry of Labour, told Econews today, commenting on a recent radio statement by the minister of labour.

The new legal regulations are currently being worked out.

How long a foreigner can stay in Hungary without a visa is also to be taken more seriously in future, meaning that a legal basis will be created for expelling those staying in Hungary without an official permit, the ministry official said.

Under the current regulations, work permits enabling foreigners to be employed here are issued in Hungary, and an application can be turned down only if there are registered Hungarian unemployed in the particular county and profession the foreigner would like to undertake employment in.

The current regulations are not sufficient for slowing down the imminent wave of economic refugees, and provide ample scope for illegal employment.

The original plan was that visa-free entry to Hungary would be maintained, whilst introducing a special work visa for those who wanted to get a job here.

This system would only be workable if a law were adopted, though, something which is impossible before the end of the year because of parliament's very tight schedule.

However, something has to be done urgently to stem the imminent tide of economic refugees, Lajos Pal stressed.

Ministry officials also plan gradually involving employee interest representation bodies in issuing work permits.

In view of the increasing unemployment in Hungary, these bodies are pressing for the system of issuing work permits to foreigners to be tightened up.

About 40,000 work permits were issued to foreigners in Hungary last year.

Another senior official at the Ministry of Labour estimated the number of foreigners in Hungary for work purposes but not listed in official statistics at another 40,000 or so.

The unemployment figure in Hungary was close on 150,000 at the end of March.

Interior Minister Fears 'Flood' of Refugees*LD2904121491 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1100 GMT 29 Apr 91*

[Text] The Hungarian minister of the interior fears that after the Soviet passport decree is adopted our country, as the first station on the way to Europe, can expect a flood of some 30 million refugees. Peter Boross said this in his opening talk to a one-week seminar organized by the National Assembly's Committee for Human Rights, Minorities, and Religious Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior. Also attending the series of consultations are experts from developed countries, who will help to work out concrete proposals.

Soviet Spokesman on Talks for Bilateral Agreement

*LD2904174291 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1400 GMT 29 Apr 91*

[Text] At the Hungarian-Soviet talks this weekend it turned out to be much more difficult than expected to find common ground for a new joint agreement between the two countries. Following moderate Budapest statements, the Soviet foreign affairs spokesman also made a statement. Zoltan Tamasi reports.

[Tamasi] The Soviet foreign affairs spokesman disagreed with the evaluation that Yuriy Kvitsinskiy's visit brought about no results at all. Churkin called the Hungarian-Soviet talks this weekend a useful working visit. In response to the second part of a question from Hungarian Radio, on whether any change can be expected in the Soviet stance, Churkin did not exclude the possibility. As he said, anything can happen in diplomacy, such as a rapprochement or change of views. However, the spokesman did not go into details as to what extent the Kvitsinskiy visit can be qualified as useful or on which issues views should become closer.

Colonel Keleti on Withdrawal of Soviet Armaments

*AU2904112691 Budapest MTI in English 0658 GMT
24 Apr 91*

[Text] Budapest, 24 April (MTI)—The issue of the withdrawal of Soviet armaments and technical devices from Hungary is in the centre of an interview with spokesman of the Hungarian Ministry of Defence Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, carried by the Hungarian daily NEPSZAVA on April 24.

"According to a report of April 21, 1991, of the 27,146 Soviet technical devices, 21,109 have been removed from Hungarian territory by midnight on April 21. 98 percent of caterpillar vehicles have already been withdrawn and so have 17,185 of the 21,726 wheeled vehicles.

"As regards tanks, there are a mere 41 of them on Hungarian soil, compared to the original number of 860. From the 622 artillery devices, only 503 have remained. All of the 196 missile launch pads have been removed."

Speaking about the date when launch pads were removed, Colonel Keleti said:

"According to our records, the majority of the launch pads were those of anti-aircraft missiles. The launch pads of tactical missiles were removed from Hungary last year, one type of it by April 29, 1990, the other by June 27. These two types of missiles are capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. The last three anti-aircraft missile launch pads were removed in February 1991.

"From the 560,912 tonnes of clothing, food, technical, and other equipment, 293,352 tonnes have been removed by midnight April 21, so more than half of the equipment is out of the country now.

"86,118 of the 100,380 Soviet citizens staying in Hungary have also left the country", Colonel Keleti concluded.

Editorial Calls For 'Truth' on Soviet Warheads

*AU2904125191 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 25 Apr 91 p 3*

[Editorial by Peter Vajda: "Nuclear"]

[Text] We have suddenly seen the light. What we have found out about nuclear affairs is a lot, but at the same time, it is too little.

We know that Soviet nuclear warheads, together with their missiles, were stored in Hungary until 1990. Nobody was informed of this, except Janos Kadar (and his successor, Karoly Grosz, as well as Grosz' successor as prime minister, Miklos Nemeth.) Hungary's successive defense ministers, and perhaps one or two other military leaders. However, other people were not aware of this presence, including Gyorgy Lazar—Hungary's long-time prime minister—and our successive foreign ministers. Parliament knew nothing about it, and the country did not have the slightest idea. For example, people in the area around Tata did not know anything, despite the launching pad and the fairly large storage facilities located in that area. Likewise, of course, Budapest citizens could not have suspected that a mere 70 km from the Ostapenko statue, rows of nuclear weapons were being stored in the silence of a deep bunker.

It was the Soviets who requested the stationing of these nuclear weapons, and it would appear that Janos Kadar made the decision on his own. The narrow Hungarian circle that was informed of the presence of the weapons did not even know exactly what kind of weapons they were, how many there were of them, and where they were being stored. They did not know exactly where these nuclear weapon storage facilities had been built within our closed military areas, despite the fact that, in principle, any kind of construction should have been subject to authorization. To put it mildly, our sovereignty was marked by large-scale (self-)restraint. Hungarian leaders only learned further details when military facilities were handed back.

That is what we know today and this knowledge shocks us. We were similarly shocked when, following Gorbachev's basic acquiescence to the withdrawal of troops, for several long months, Soviet military leaders refused to hold real troop withdrawal talks with their Hungarian partners.

We have found out quite a lot, yet this knowledge is little compared to what we do not know. Why was the request made to transport these nuclear weapons here? What was the excuse? And when exactly was the request made? What kind of warheads were stored in Hungary? When were they delivered, and when were they taken back? What plans had been made for the use of these weapons? Why did the Soviet chief of staff in October 1990—without consulting a single Hungarian leader—suddenly mention the withdrawal of these weapons of mass destruction from Hungary, weapons that had officially never been delivered here? Why did Hungarian military officials choose to deny this news, saying that, yes, there were Soviet missiles in Hungary, but that they were only equipped with conventional warheads?

It is a good thing that the Soviet Defense Ministry now admits that these weapons were here. It is a good thing, even if the ministry leaves more questions unanswered than answered. Every little step counts. Nevertheless, questions should be answered, as completely and as soon as possible. Our new system of relations—which we so desperately need—can only be fundamentally different to the former obsolete one if we know the truth about yesterday. Sooner or later, they will probably show us a nuclear bunker. “Hungarian nuclear secrets” also need to be prized open.

Oil Talks With Iran Reach ‘Advanced Stage’

*LD2904144691 Budapest MTI in English 1323 GMT
29 Apr 91*

[Text] Budapest, April 29 (MTI)—The talks being held in Tehran on the purchase of Iranian oil by the Hungarian company Mineralimpex have reached an advanced stage.

In the current joint committee session, the Iranian Government called for increased Hungarian oil imports to improve the balance of two-way trade.

At the session Bela Kadar, minister of international economic relations, pledged to buy 0.5 million tonnes of oil, whereas Iran is keen to sell a minimum of 1 million tonnes to Hungary this year. Iranian oil is of the same quality as the Soviet, but is more expensive because of the considerable transport costs.

Hungary attaches great importance to the development of relations with Iran, which has become its major partner among the the developing countries, with 23 million dollars worth of goods going there in the first quarter.

Iranian letters of credit designed to finance Hungarian exports currently amount to 160 million dollars. Last year's Hungarian sales to Iran totalled 123 million dollars.

President Walesa Comments on UK Visit

*LD2604225591 Warsaw TVP Television Network
in Polish 1730 GMT 26 Apr 91*

[Interview with President Lech Walesa by unidentified reporter in Gdansk airport on 26 April—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Walesa] In my view the trip [to Great Britain] was very successful, but as for the results, well, we will wait, as always. For after all, I did not go to immediately bring something back with me.

[Reporter] This time, the president did not bring a unilateral remission of the debts [words indistinct].

[Walesa] Ah, because they have elections coming up.

[Reporter] Mr. President, what are the most important things to be done in the country today, tomorrow, and on Monday?

[Walesa] Well, I have to go to Warsaw first and see what the most important thing is.

[Unidentified spokesman from presidential party] The talks with Major, the talks with Kinnock from the opposition, the talks with Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, the talks with the banks, the talks with everyone who counts in Great Britain, all had an enormous significance. I can put it another way. We are coming not only with a reduction, a reduction of the debt that comes to \$1.3 billion, but as the president said, the British perhaps say little, but do more.

[Announcer] Lech Walesa won over the British, said Secretary of State Janusz Ziolkowski after the end of the official visit of the president of the Republic to Great Britain. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] There was no success in resolving the matter of visas. In the view of the president's interlocutors, Poles in this country would help their countrymen in the attainment of jobs, and with the recession in Great Britain, this is not desirable for the government of Prime Minister Major.

Skubiszewski Comments on Talks in UK

*LD2804212491 Warsaw TVP Television Network
in Polish 2015 GMT 28 Apr 91*

[Excerpt] The matter of a Polish-German treaty on good-neighborliness and partner-like cooperation has already been closed. The treaty will not be published before it is accepted by both governments. Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski said after his return from the FRG. Before his visit to Germany, Minister Skubiszewski was in Great Britain and also took part in a meeting of foreign ministers of the Council of Europe.

[Begin Skubiszewski recording] This was the last meeting of the ministers before a general election in Poland. There is great interest by the Council of Europe in the course of the preparations and a final date for the general

election itself. Poland will become a member of the Council of Europe and will be invited to join after it has been ascertained that free parliamentary elections took place. [end recording]

During his trip, Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski held talks with his British counterpart, Douglas Hurd, on lifting visa requirements for Polish citizens.

[Begin Skubiszewski recording] At the moment, there is no chance of the British lifting visa requirements for travelers from Poland. The will to facilitate the issuing of visas still exists, although one must say that there are relatively many negative decisions to Polish visa applications, simply because after a conversation with an applicant, it appears that our travelers want to go there to work. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Skubiszewski Returns From FRG, Views Talks

*LD2804183291 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
1700 GMT 28 Apr 91*

[Interview with Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski by Krystyna Koziol at Warsaw airport; date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Koziol] Minister, the draft Polish-German treaty on good-neighborliness and cooperation is apparently complete. Twice during your visit, sir, you spoke to Minister Genscher.

[Skubiszewski] I can say that the text of the treaty in its entirety has been agreed upon. After talks at the beginning of the week between our representatives and the German delegation in Bonn, certain points that have not been finally prejudged now remain. This was precisely the subject of my talks with Minister Genscher in Weimar, which took place in a very good atmosphere. We reached agreement, so that matter of the text is already closed. The governments now have to authorize this text. This is a treaty that encompasses the entire issue of cooperation. For me, who promoted the idea of a Polish-German community of interests, it is a good foundation for the further building of this community.

[Koziol] How was the issue of minorities—in relation to Polish emigrants who do not have German citizenship—registered in the treaty?

[Skubiszewski] Polish citizens who live in Germany—and many of them still have not had their circumstances regulated—but also those who do have regulated circumstances, Polish citizens who have permission to stay, as well as work permits in Germany, cannot be counted within any minority in Germany for the reason that they are foreigners. I cannot discuss all the details now, because these texts are still secret, but I expect that when the texts are published it will become clear that we have not forgotten about this group. [passage omitted]

The question of the incidents involving Poles on German territory was also raised. I indicated that we saw

all this in the correct proportions, because that is how it must be seen. The attitudes of certain marginal groups in Germany are not the position of all Germans. I drew attention to one thing; namely, that the German police ought to function efficiently and energetically, and this is what we are demanding. I indicated here that in our opinion, from what we knew, the German police in the eastern part of Germany are not quite active enough. We will be monitoring these incidents. The Foreign Ministry immediately issued a statement. Then the German charge d'affaires—to whom we conveyed our protest and stated our anxiety—was summoned. We believe that this will be brought under control and brought to order in Germany. (In our opinion), if this does not take place, it will reflect on our relations.

Skubiszewski Opposes Dual Nationality for Germans

LD2704212691 Hamburg DPA in German 1820 GMT
27 Apr 91

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—In an interview with Deutschlandfunk radio, the Polish foreign minister once again came out against the introduction of dual nationality for Germans living in Poland. This concept is already a serious problem in international law, and this is not a question concerning the agreed protection of minorities.

Commenting on incidents at the German-Polish border after the introduction of visa-free travel, Skubiszewski said these are "marginal actions of politically motivated people". The foreign minister said he knows that they were not representative of the attitude of the German people. The police, however, should take more effective action in this area.

Reportage on Skubiszewski Visit to Germany

WA2904200691

For reportage on the visit by Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski to Germany, including reports on his talks with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, see the Germany section of the 29 April West Europe DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

Industry Minister Comments on Ties With USSR

PM3004103191 Wroclaw GAZETA ROBOTNICZA
in Polish 22 Apr 91 p 7

["Unauthorized" interview with Industry Minister Professor Andrzej Zawislak by Grzegorz Chmielowski; place and date not given: "There Is No Anti-Russian Feeling Here"]

[Text] Professor Andrzej Zawislak, industry minister and—since a few days ago—chairman of the Poland-Soviet Union Association, visited Legnica Voivodship

recently. His agenda included a meeting with General Viktor Dubynin, commander of the Soviet Armed Forces in Poland.

[Chmielowski] Have you talked to Soviet military commanders of such a high rank before?

[Zawislak] No, the Legnica talks were the first occasion for me.

[Chmielowski] ...and?

[Zawislak] In strictly "social" terms, I was very positively impressed with them.

[Chmielowski] You landed at the the large airport in Krzywa and also visited many other interesting installations administered by the Russians. Do you have some concrete plans for their future use?

[Zawislak] I have many concrete plans, but it would be premature to announce them today.

[Chmielowski] How do you assess the public's attitudes when it comes to the issue of Polish-Russian relations?

[Zawislak] For very many years, when our mutual friendship was officially encouraged, a great deal of bad feeling accumulated around this concept. Nevertheless, I believe that one thing is beyond all doubt: There is no evidence of the existence of anti-Russian feelings on a statistically significant scale in Poland. Perhaps we do not nurture feelings of overwhelming friendship for them but, fortunately, we have no problem here with the Polish public being anti-Russian.

[Chmielowski] What about economic cooperation?

[Zawislak] If we look at these things from a historical perspective, there are many indications that unless we develop correct relations with our eastern neighbor and reinforce them by a climate of positive emotions, we will not be able to achieve much. This is because, in a situation where rivals competing against us in the Russian market have a lot more to offer in terms of both technology and economic attractiveness, the only card we can play is the fact that our respective societies share close emotional, cultural, and historical ties and that there are very many attributes we have in common that make it easier for a Pole than a Japanese or, say, a German to do business in Russia.

[Chmielowski] How did you come to head the Polish-Soviet Union Association?

[Zawislak] First, because of the failure of several dozen industrial enterprises whose only raison d'être was their exports to the Soviet Union. I hope that through my contacts as chairman of the association I will be able to assist in finding a solution of this problem. Second, let me impress it upon you that no one makes a brilliant political career by heading the Poland-Soviet Union Association. If I agreed to be its chairman, it was because of a stronger motivation. It was not just an ideological

Christian motivation, or personal affection, or the awareness of a need to eradicate xenophobia in our society. It was also the reasoning of a head of the industry sector who knows that, during all periods of its most dynamic development, Poland turned toward the Black Sea.

'Illegal Arms Cache' Found in Bytom

LD2704224691 Warsaw TVP Television Network
in Polish 1730 GMT 27 Apr 91

[Text] The UOP [Office of State Protection] has confirmed that a tip-off given by the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland] revealed an illegal arms cache in Bytom and allowed the arrest of its holder. According to KPN activists, no further information was given to the UOP about other arms caches held by an alleged secret terrorist organization, nor about proscription lists being prepared by this organization.

Better International Environmental Control Urged

AU2804174891 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA
in Polish 23 Apr 91 p 3

[jg] report: "Acid Wind in One's Face"]

[Text] Poland should try to bring about changes in international law that would effectively counteract pollution from outside the country, said the Sejm Foreign Affairs and Environmental Protection Commissions in a letter to Prime Minister Bielecki.

The deputies in these commissions pointed out that although Poland itself causes a lot of pollution, it receives rather more fumes and emissions as a result of unfavorable winds from the neighboring countries. For example, Germany sends Poland nine times more sulfur and nitrogen emissions than vice versa.

The deputies believe these pollution figures should be considered during talks on Poland's debts toward Germany, because the damage caused to Poland by German pollution is several times higher than the value of Polish debts to that country.

The deputies suggested adding new features to the international conventions and agreements that already exist, such as accepting responsibility for environmental damage to other countries as a result of industrial activity in one's own country, or "trade and financial concessions in the transfer of technology and know-how that could solve problems of environmental protection."

The deputies also demanded a detailed examination of the extent of the environmental damage caused by the Soviet Army in Poland.

Peasant Party Retains Chairman Bartoszcze

LD2704211191 Warsaw PAP in English 2009 GMT
27 Apr 91

[Text] Warsaw, April 27—The supreme board of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), debating here today, voted by 40-35 ballots against recalling Roman Bartoszcze from the post of the PSL chairman. The meeting of the board was dominated by personnel questions raised by Bartoszcze's well-known statement on decommunization of the PSL made last March.

The board also discussed problems of implementing political contract signed at their 1990 unity congress. We will not let ourselves be divided and those who take steps to the detriment of the PSL and the peasant movement can leave us, Roman Bartoszcze said in conclusion.

List of Security Service Collaborators Demanded

AU2804171491 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA
in Polish 23 Apr p 2

[LAW]-signed article: "Opening Up the Archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs To Clear the Air"]

[Text] The Christian National Union "demands that once a list of candidates seeking election as deputies and senators is released, the president of the Republic of Poland should request that the names of those who were secret collaborators of the Security Service be revealed."

On Monday, the Union's main board stated that "Polish public opinion has a right to know who wants to represent it in the Sejm and the Senate."

As GAZETA was told by Ryszard Czarnecki, the Christian National Union press spokesman, "It is a question of clearing the air before the election campaign so there are none of the scandals that occurred in the former GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria" when the names of members of the legislatures who had previously cooperated with the secret police were revealed.

Czarnecki said that the Christian National Union does not intend to provoke similar affairs in the current Polish Parliament, although, in his opinion, the situation is no doubt similar. "On the basis of what Krzysztof Kozlowski, the former head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, has said, there are people in Parliament, representing various political groupings, who at one time cooperated with the Security Service."

The union's representatives in Parliament intend to announce amendments to the electoral code that would make it obligatory to release the names of those candidates whose names appear on Ministry of Internal Affairs archive lists of those who acted as informers for the previous authorities. Czarnecki did, however, say that he would not prevent former collaborators from running in the elections: "People have a right to change, but if they decide to take part in public life, they should

be open about their past. Society may elect them, but it also has a right to know who is representing it."

Asked why the union addressed its appeal to the president, Czarnecki replied: "There are forces in the Sejm, which is the product of an agreement, that will seek to block the amendment, mainly the Social Democratic Party of the Republic of Poland, but not only that party. The president should use his authority to have the amendment adopted."

Electricity, Gas Price Hikes Expected 1 June

LD2604225491 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 1730 GMT 26 Apr 91

[Excerpts] The electricity and gas price rises, previously announced for 1 May, have been postponed. In the opinion of the Ministry of Industry, the decision to introduce [price rises] will be made around 1 June.

The Ministry of Industry is proposing a rise in electricity charges for individual consumers of 115 percent, and a rise in gas charges of 148 percent. Industrial consumers would be paying 27 percent more for electricity and 20 percent more for gas. [passage omitted]

The price of the main raw material of energy—coal—has increased in comparison with last year by more than 220,000 [currency not specified] a tonne. In the same way, the price of natural gas has in comparison with 1990 risen fivefold.

The price of raw materials, transport costs, taxes, and the so-called internal costs of the institutions linked to the production of energy—these are the reasons given for the price rises. Truly, only structural changes in this area of the economy can bring down the high costs of home-produced energy.

Opinion Poll Assesses Views on Economy

LD2604115991 Warsaw PAP in English 0928 GMT 26 Apr 91

[Text] Warsaw, April 26—Every fifth respondent to the Public Opinion Research Centre poll carried on April 12-15 described Poland's present economic situation as good (15 per cent in March), every fourth as average and 48 per cent of the respondents as bad (53 per cent in March). 6 per cent of the respondents did not have an opinion. Although the percentage of negative opinions is considerably higher than positive ones, April results are the best ones in the past 12 months.

Also, April forecasts on changes in Poland's economic situation are somewhat more optimistic than in March. 48 per cent of the respondents expect it to improve (43 per cent in March). According to 19 per cent, the situation will remain unchanged, and 16 per cent think that it will worsen (19 per cent of such opinions in March). 17 per cent of the polled did not have an opinion on this question.

The Balcerowicz plan is sized up more positively now than in March. Now, 37 per cent of the respondents declared support for it (a 6-per-cent rise) and 25 per cent deny support for it (27 per cent in March). The percentage of the respondents admitting that they do not know the government economic programme invariably high (36 per cent of such statements in April as compared with 29 per cent in March).

Opinions by the polled on society's living standards continue to be decisively unfavourable. 67 per cent of the respondents deem them bad, 20 per cent - average and 11 per cent - good (6 per cent of such opinions in March and 9 per cent in February).

The expectations concerning the coming months are more optimistic.

Prime Minister Presents Cabinet Changes

AU2904141691 Bucharest Domestic Service
in Romanian 1204 GMT 29 Apr 91

[Address by Prime Minister Petre Roman at the Deputies' Assembly session in Bucharest—live]

[Text] Mr. President, Messrs. Deputies: The government that was formed on 28 June 1990 on the basis of your vote has been and continues to be the government of economic reform whose essence is included in the declaration-program presented on that occasion. During successive stages, summarized in the reports presented in parliament later—on 18 October 1990 and on 26 February this year—all the difficulties of the reform, as well as the economic and social program for the coming period were discussed. I do not propose and it is not necessary to present to you substantial programmatic elements in connection with our general economic orientation and the progress of our reform.

The legitimate government that was set up in the wake of the 20 May elections last year has not been and is not a government of the past, and even less so a government for the past. It has been and is a government that proposed and is performing current administration to build a dignified and prosperous future for our nation.

The reform process has to advance step by step on the basis of an adequate legislative framework that has been endorsed by you. We have reached a point in which each stage has to be safeguarded and consolidated from both an economic and social viewpoint. We have reached a point when, confronted with—sometimes acute—financial shortages, we have to make the most effective corrections to be realistic, while at the same time also changing reality. We have to be flexible in our actions, but at the same time inflexible when it comes to the objectives of the reform, namely the transition to a free but not merciless economy, solidly based on market principles, but with strategically clear goals and orientations. We have reached a point when the dynamics of a possible speedy reform process have to be continued without any interruption.

The modifications in the government composition, which I have the honor to present and propose today, are required by the current situation and the legislative, economic, and social events and facts. The events and facts are closely correlated and have caused wear and tear in the case of some individual government members. The ability to implement the established norms, to correct whatever is not working properly as one goes along, and to be flexible in accordance with the reaction of the economic and social mechanism has to be one of the first roles played by the new government team in the coming period.

It has been necessary for us to bear in mind—with great responsibility and at least to the same extent—the country's political development, to be consistent in our opening to the political forces represented in parliament

by favoring them through a broader political vision to share the difficult responsibility of performing the transition, and to increase confidence in the irreversible nature of the political and economic democratization of our society.

These efforts have been given concrete shape today through the presence of some opposition political forces within the government and at the government level. Because of different political opinions, which we view as unjustified, other political forces have not joined these efforts.

First, let me present the new cabinet members:

Eugen Dijmarescu, minister of economy and finance, with the rank of minister of state;

Mr. Dan Mircea Popescu, minister of state in charge of the quality of life and social security;

General Constantin (?Niculae Spiroiu), minister of national defense;

Let me say something about each one of the new people in the government: Dan Mircea Popescu was born on 6 October 1950, in Bucharest; he graduated from Bucharest Law University in 1975; [word indistinct] of the Bucharest University, the Law Faculty; he worked as a consultant lawyer and scientific researcher at the Institute of Political Science and as university lecturer in international relations; after the revolution, he was presidential adviser for domestic policy matters.

General Constantin (?Niculae Spiroiu) was born on 6 July 1936; graduated from the Military School of Officers in 1960 and from the Engineering Department of the Military Scientific Academy in 1971; he completed post-university studies in 1986 and was deputy section chief at an arms department; last May he was appointed deputy commander at (?the technical) department of an arms command; most recently he has been a secretary of state of the department for Army supplies.

Mr. Victor Stanculescu, minister of industry;

Mr. Mihnea Marmeliuc, minister of labor and social security. Mr. Mihnea Marmeliuc comes from the Liberal Party orientation. Here are a few details about him: born on 10 January 1924, Cernauti [Chernovtsy]; he graduated from the Aron Pumnul High School of Cernauti and Mihai Viteazul High School of Bucharest; he graduated magna cum laude from Bucharest Law University in 1946; PhD in political and economic sciences; PhD in legal science, in 1974; he specialized in labor law in [word indistinct], Italy and European Community law in Strasbourg; member of the Bucharest Municipality lawyers' bar; he has published many articles and critical notes on legal matters; he has belonged to the National Liberal Party [PNL] since 1944.

Mr. (?Traian Vasescu), minister of transportation; born on 4 November 1951 in (?Basarab), Constanta County; he graduated from the Mircea cel Batrin [Mircea the

Old] Marine Institute, the Navigation Faculty, Trade Department, in (?1974); he has a license as captain for (?long-range cruises); he was head of the trade agency in Anvers, Belgium, and chief inspector of the Civil Navigation Inspectorate; most recently, he has been under secretary of state at the Ministry of Transportation;

Mr. Dinu Patriciu, minister of public works and physical planning; he belongs to the National Liberal Party-Young Wing; born on 3 August 1950, in Bucharest; he graduated from Caragiale High School of Bucharest; he graduated from Bucharest's Ion Mincu Architecture Institute in 1975; was assistant lecturer at the same institute, head of the design department of the Architecture Institute, PhD; has published and completed many studies in architecture magazines at home and abroad;

Mr. Radu Berceanu, deputy, minister of youth and sports; Mr. Radu Berceanu was born on 5 March 1953 in Rimnicul Vilcea; he graduated from Bucharest Polytechnic [Institute], the Aircraft Faculty; worked as an engineer, in Craiova; and now, as you well know, is a deputy in the Deputies' Assembly;

Mr. Florian Bercea, minister in charge of the budget, within the Ministry of Economy and Finance; born on 28 December 1937, in (?Dinauti), Bihor County; he graduated from the Finance, Credits, and Accountancy Faculty in 1962; he has held all professorial ranks, including that of university professor, and the finance chair; he received a PhD in economics in 1971; since last August, he has been a secretary of state, chief of the Taxes and Dues Department of the Ministry of Finance; he is the author of very many scientific papers and studies published in various specialty magazines;

Mr. Valeriu Pescaru belongs to the Democratic Agrarian Party, and is secretary of state at the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry, and member of the government in charge of privatization; born in 1934, in Breaza, Prahova County; he graduated from the Mechanization and (?Data Processing) Faculty of the Economic Science Academy; PhD in economic cybernetics; was director of the Cybernetics and Data Processing Center; was the main engineer and then director of the Computer Center of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry; director of the Directorate for Technical Research and Progress in the Commission for Mountainous Areas; and associate lecturer at the Scientific Economic Academy; he published many papers in data processing and agrarian economy; he is a deputy from the Democratic Agrarian Party in the Deputies' Assembly;

Finally, Mr. Ion Aurel Stoica, minister without portfolio.

Ladies and gentlemen deputies, we must look ahead to the future, trust the future, and thus build it. To achieve this goal, we should see that the great potential of manpower's professional skill bear fruit under favorable conditions. We must put into motion all our energies, all our active intelligence, and the whole creative capability of our

nation. We must launch as many vast projects as possible in various economic sectors such as: agriculture, food industry, civic construction, trade and tourist infrastructure, gas and oil exploitation, and construction materials. We must fully relaunch work in investment and industrial projects which are in various stages of completion, and have a sure chance of success, in the following areas: energy and mining, water management, civic construction of public interest, and land improvement.

Finally—but something that probably has to be finished as soon as possible—we should rehabilitate some industrial sectors that can achieve technical parameters, economic efficiency, and profitability, compatible on international markets such as: energy and mining, petrochemical and chemical industry, metallurgy, textile and lead industry, timber industry, aircraft industry, traction building equipment, electric appliances, oil equipment, ships and hydraulic machines, as well as many others, whose possibilities we have not yet discovered.

You will have the opportunity to talk things over, to discuss, and then vote.

In all the economic sectors I have mentioned, the fundamental problem is to add value to the process of manufacturing products, at lowest possible costs. That is the source of real income, the one that can be seen in the [words indistinct] of the bank and can also be seen with society's naked eye. Likewise, we must finally admit that only in an economic area, in which the initiative and enterprising spirit are manifested freely, can one reach a stage of development that ensures the nation's prosperity.

Therefore, we should rapidly proceed to the small and big scale privatization and we should ensure correct but unhampered access to the formation of small private units, particularly productive units, which are a primary means to reemploy manpower, to rapidly satisfy the needs of life, create a dynamic pace in economy before the relaunching of the big industry.

Ladies and gentlemen deputies, all the steps I have mentioned are meant to support the program for economic reestablishment, to employ manpower, and implement the economic reform, which is defined by legal norms that have already been approved by you.

In the past 20 years we have heard much talk about countries that achieved miracles in economy. I am truly convinced that a new road is ahead of us, and a [word indistinct] road, because Romania can become a miracle. A miracle not because it achieves something that has never been seen but because Romania becomes something that we know it can become: a country where it is really good to live. Thank you. [applause]

Proposed New Government Listed

AU3004075091 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
2244 GMT 29 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 29/4/1991—Prime Minister Petre Roman's nominees:

1. Minister of state—in charge of the economy and finance—Eugen Dijmarescu (FSN) [National Salvation Front]
 2. Minister of state—in charge of quality of life and social welfare—Dan Mircea Popescu (FSN)
 3. Minister of National Defence—General Constantin Niculae Spiroiu
 4. Minister of Industry—Victor Stanculescu—independent
 5. Minister of Labour and Social Security—Mihnea Marmeliuc—PNL [National Liberal Party]
 6. Minister of Transport—Traian Basescu—(FSN)
 7. Minister of Public Works and Physical Planning—Dinu Patriciu—PNL—young wing
 8. Minister of Youth and Sports—Radu Berceanu—FSN
 9. Minister in charge of the budget—Florian Bercea—FSN
 10. Secretary of state in the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, in charge of privatisation, member of the government—Valeriu Pescaru—Agrarian-Democratic Party
 11. Minister without portfolio—Ion Aurel Stoica—FSN
- Dan Mircea Popescu

Born on 6 October 1950 in Bucharest, 1975 graduate of the Faculty of Law, Bucharest, with the highest qualification, holder of a PhD (law) from the Faculty of Law, Bucharest, he worked as a legal adviser and researcher with the Institute of Political Sciences, then as reader in international relations with the Academy of Socio-Political Sciences, Bucharest. Later, as foreign policy expert, member of the Provisory Council of National Union, as counsellor to the president (1990-91). He is a member of the FSN Steering Committee.

Mihnea Marmeliuc

Born on 10 January 1924 at Cernauti (Chernovtsy), Bukovina (now USSR), he attended the reputed high schools "Aron Pumnul" in Cernauti and Mihai Viteazul in Bucharest, graduated from the Faculty of Law, Bucharest in June, 1946, as a "magna cum laudae," took a doctor's degree in political and economic sciences (1948), a PhD in juridical sciences with the Romanian Academy (1974) and attended post academic courses in

Trieste, Italy, (1972/73) in "Comparative Labour Law," under the aegis of the Strasbourg International School of Comparative Study of Law, and in "European Community Law," at Strasbourg (1979/80), both of which he completed "cum laudae." At present, member of the Bucharest bar assn. author of 18 essays, surveys on labour legislation, common law and civil code. Since 1944, a member of the National Liberal Party.

Traian Basescu

Born on 4 November, 1951 at Basarabi, Constanta County, 1976 graduate from the "Mircea cel Batran" Navy Institute, Merchant Navy Section, he obtained his master's certificate in 1981. In 1987 he was appointed chief of the Navrom commercial representation in Anvers, Belgium, and in 1989 chief inspector of the shipping inspectorate in the Ministry of Transport. In October 1990 he took over the state undersecretariate in the Ministry of Transport.

[Text] Dinu Patriciu

Born on 3 August 1950, Bucharest, 1969 graduate of "I. L. Caragiale" High School, Bucharest, completed the "Ion Mincu" Institute of Architecture, Bucharest, in 1975 with the highest qualification. Worked as an assistant professor with the chair of planning of the Institute of Architecture (1979-1990), as chief of the designing compartment (1987-90). PhD holder of the same institute (1986), author of speciality surveys and projects published in magazines at home and abroad.

Florian Bercea

Born 28 December 1937, at Tinaud, Bihor County, 1962 graduate of the Faculty of Finance, credit and accountancy of the Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest. Promoted, between 1962-1991, all the steps of academic hierarchy at the chair of finance-currency. Holder of a PhD since 1971, secretary of state and head of the Fiscal and Taxation Department of the Ministry of Finance since August 1990, author of more than 50 works.

Valeriu Pescaru

Born 1937 at Breaza, Prahova County, 1959 graduate of the Faculty of Automation of Computing Operations, holder of a PhD in economic cybernetics (1975), he worked with the Central Statistics Department and as a director of the Economic Cybernetics Centre, then as an engineer with the Computer Section of the Ministry of Supply, as director of the Computer Dept. of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry and, since 1990, as director of the Research and Technical Progress Dept. of the Mountain Development Commission of Romania.

Over 1962-1985, he was associated professor with the Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest and published several papers on informatics, economic cybernetics and economics of agriculture.

Constantin Nicolae Spiroiu

Born July 6, 1936, in Bucharest.

He attended the Mihai Viteazul High School, the Cadets' School which he graduated in 1960 as chief of his batch. He then went to the Technical Military Academy and graduated in 1971. In 1984 he graduated the Strategy, Tactics and Operative Art Post-Academic Course. Scientific research. Works of scientific research in armoured machines, military cars and tractors (studies, articles, co-author and editor of military technique literature). Inventor and innovator. Doctorand with the Military Technical Academy. Officer in the Section of Development of Technology of an Arms Command. Head of section and deputy in a technical dept with the same command. Since May 1990 head of section and deputy for technique in the same command. Since November 1990 secretary of state and chief of the Equipment Department of the Ministry of National Defence.

Radu Mircea Berceanu

Born on March 5, 1953, at Rimnicu Vilcea. Graduate of the Bucharest Polytechnic, Aircraft Faculty. He worked in Craiova as an engineer. He is a member of the Assembly of Deputies. Married. Two children.

Parliamentary Reactions to Reshuffle

AU2904210791 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1937 GMT 29 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 29/4/1991—"We will vote against it" stated Deputy Ion Diaconescu in behalf of the parliamentary group of the Christian Democratic National Peasant Party after the announcement of the reshuffle proposed by the Romanian Prime Minister Roman on April 29.

"The reshuffle set forth is far from meeting the expectations of public opinion", the speaker added.

"You are inviting us to constructive opposition to your government", the prime minister was told by Dan Lazarescu of the National Liberal Party Parliamentary group. "We are ready for a constructive opposition", Lazarescu stated, but for the opposition to be constructive it should be consulted."

The Hungarian democratic Union of Romania chairman, Deputy Geza Domokos, reproached the prime minister with having taken "a wrong way" and with "not trusting the society". He demanded that

voting be not held today, so that the political formations may ponder over the proposals advanced.

Sergiu Cunescu, in behalf of the Social-Democratic and Ecological Parliamentary Group, stated that his group considered it could not give its confidence to the new government.

Further Reaction to Government Reshuffle

AU3004092891 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
0800 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 30/4/1991—Mihai Balanescu (Ecological Movement):

Romania should enjoy greater credibility outside. Which cannot be achieved with the designated team. A national unity government would have been desirable to rally all the forces that stand for competence and value in the country to take us out of the present impasse.

Nae Bedros (National Liberal Party):

This reshuffle is purely cosmetic. We had initiated talks on joining the government. This is no stray impulse of the leading personalities of political parties, it shows a high sense of responsibility because involvement in the current social, political and economic circumstances carries with it a high measure of risk, it is an act of courage that we regard as the only possible solution now to take the country out of the economic ruin it was brought to by the incapacity of the government.

Victor Vaida (Social Democratic and Ecologist Parliamentary Group):

The task of the government is particularly arduous. I think more attention ought to be paid to ecology. We will support the government.

George Manole (FSN-20 May) [National Salvation Front]:

The government's attempt today is an attempt to find an issue to the crisis. But I don't think it will be successful. The government programme should be reconsidered. Our view is that the reshuffle should have gone deeper. On the other hand, for the crisis to end, the legislative forum ought to use its right of control over the executive, over how the reform is implemented.

Ion Moldovan (FSN):

As far as this government reshuffle is concerned, Mr. prime minister forgot to say that he had wanted to cooperate with several voices, but he met with the following positions: There were persons who could but would not cooperate, there were others who would but could not cooperate, then there were still others who neither could nor would cooperate, and finally there were the ones that are now in the government who can as well as will.

Senate Endorses Roman's Cabinet Changes

AU2904210691 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1839 GMT 29 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/4/1991—Soon after Prime Minister Roman presented to the Assembly of Deputies the changes made in the government composition, he sustained in the Senate the same proposals of reshuffle. He stressed that the flexibility and dynamics of the process of transition to the market economy had to be maintained permanently. It was in that context that Roman placed the changes he proposed in the composition of his government as well as the option of the majority ruling group for opening to the opposition parties.

Also, Prime Minister Roman announced that a number of members of the former cabinet were replaced for various reasons. It was about Anton Vatasescu, who accepted the appointment as ambassador in France, Romulus Neagu, who was appointed ambassador to the United Nations headquarters in Geneva, Mihai Zisu, Teodor Stolojan, Doru Pana, Catalin Zamfir, Bogdan Niculescu Duvaz.

Answering questions posed by senators, the prime minister showed that more substantive changes that should include outstanding personalities of the opposition could not be done, since the respective parties did not want to share in governing. But, he said, that reshuffle was a first step, an opening that could be more substantive in a not too distant future, considering that the transition enjoyed consensus and the responsibilities had to be assumed by all those so willing.

Then followed the Senate debates.

Senator Radu Ceantea—National Unity Party of Romanians—expressed in his address regret that the prime minister omitted, on making up the list of the new cabinet, the Senate's recommendations regarding the Ministry of Education and Science.

Emil Tokacsi—National Liberal Party [PNL]—said, in turn, that Marmeliuc, proposed for the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, would participate in the government as an independent personality and not as a representative of the PNL as he had not been given his party's OK. Senator Petru Pop—FSN [National Salvation Front]—inquired about the structure of the Ministry of Industry, asking for details from the would-be minister, General Victor Stanculescu, and Senator Gheorghe Damian—FSN—asked the nominees to present the strategy they would pursue in the sectors for which they had been proposed.

Senator Marcian Bleahu—Ecological Movement—asked the prime minister to present the political option of the new ministers, which Roman promptly did.

Senator Ivan Sabin—PNL—asked the prime minister whether the new members of the cabinet who were not FSN members had their respective parties' blessing to participate in the cabinet. The prime minister answered that certain

political reasons made the opposition parties decline the participation in the government coalition and hoped the future would bring the government greater opening from the opposition, as it was only logical that everyone claiming to be worried about the country's destiny should give a helping hand in its refloating.

The Senate endorsed Romanian prime minister's proposed reshuffle. The least nays were given to Bercea (16), the most to Patriciu (38). None of the 112 voting senators abstained.

Deputies Reject Two Roman Nominees

AU3004085791 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
0813 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 30/4/1991—Assembly of Deputies rejects two of the nominated ministers.

Messrs. Dinu Patriciu (outstanding member of the National Liberal Party-young wing and Radu Berceanu (FSN) [National Salvation Front] did not get the necessary number of votes in the Assembly of Deputies to join the reshuffled government proposed by Premier Petre Roman.

The former got 166 votes for and 170 votes against and the latter 147 votes for and 189 votes against.

The other nine personalities designated to join the reshuffled government got a comfortable majority of votes.

As many as 336 deputies voted.

Assembly Endorses Nine Roman Nominees

AU3004094791 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
0918 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 30/4/1991—The Assembly of Deputies validated Tuesday morning nine of the eleven proposals Premier Petre Roman advanced Monday afternoon for a change in the government's composition. Here are the results of the vote: Mr. Eugen Dijmarescu, minister of economics and finance, with a rank of minister of state: 255 pros and 81 cons; Mr. Dan Mircea Popescu, minister of state in charge of the quality of life and social protection: 235 pros and 101 cons; Mr. Nicolae Constantin Spiroiu, minister of defence: 252 pros and 84 cons; Mr. Victor Stanculescu, minister of industry: 216 pros and 120 cons; Mr. Mihnea Marmeliuc, minister of labour and social security: 236 pros and 100 cons; Mr. Traian Basescu, minister of transport: 234 pros and 102 cons; Mr. Dinu Patriciu, minister of public works and physical planning: 166 pros and 170 cons; Mr. Radu Berceanu, minister of youth and sports: 147 pros and 189 cons; Mr. Florian Bercea, minister in charge of the budget in the Ministry of Finance: 257 pros and 79 cons; Mr. Valeriu Pescaru, secretary of state at the Ministry of Agriculture and the

Food Industry in charge of privatization: 260 pros and 76 cons; Mr. Ion Aurel Stoica, minister without portfolio: 236 pros and 100 cons.

As Mr. Dinu Patriciu (PNL [National Liberal Party]—the young wing) and Radu Berceanu (FSN) [National Salvation Front] failed to meet a quorum, they cannot hold the ministerial portfolios proposed.

PNL Rejects 'Cosmetic' Cabinet Changes

*AU2904210591 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1813 GMT 29 Apr 91*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/4/1991—The leadership of the National Liberal Party [PNL] issued a communique specifying that no PNL member has been associated to the reshuffled cabinet of Premier Petre Roman.

The press release published Monday evening, 29 April, in Bucharest, states that the government changes are a mere cosmetic modification, which brings nothing new in the relationships between the power and the opposition and is not apt to pull the country out of the present deadlock.

Iliescu Termed 'Good Showman' at News Conference

*AU3004085391 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian
25 Apr 91 p 5*

[Romulus Caplescu article: "New 'Recital' in the Yellow Hall at Cotroceni Palace"]

[Text] The hall adorned with yellow silk wallpaper, designed for theatrical performances—one of the most pompous rooms at Cotroceni Palace—hosted an unusual performance on Wednesday [24 April] afternoon: Mr. Iliescu's news conference. The "spectators"—Romanian and foreign journalists—completely filled the orchestra pit and the boxes and took their seats comfortably in the splendid period armchairs. Stimulated by the atmosphere—being in the limelight in the middle of the stage—the Romanian president began his news conference with a statement of his allegiance. He said that in our times, heads of state have become a type of actors maneuvered by the mass media, and gave the example of the speech made last year by President Bush at the rostrum of the United Nations: although he gave the impression that he was improvising, everything was carried out with the precision of a clock, according to a previously set scenario. "I do not know whether I will ever learn to do the same" said the president modestly. Although when it comes to smiles nobody can deny his competence.

After this preamble, a short introductory speech followed, in which the president expressed regret over the fact that others have succeeded in presenting a more favorable picture of their own country to the world than we do. Strains and the tense political climate might perhaps explain such behavior as the hostile demonstrations of a part of the Romanian diaspora on the occasion of Mr. Iliescu's recent visit to London and the elementary lack of politeness to a guest of the country that we witnessed during the recent visit paid by President Mitterrand to Bucharest. A useful remark: as a real gentleman, Mr. Ion Ratiu apologized for the demonstration organized by his son, Mr. Ion Ratiu Jr., in the British capital, saying that he was not involved in any way in this business. The conclusion of the introductory chapter was: it is a matter of patriotism to know how to behave before the world.

Then, it was the journalists' turn to take the stage. It was surprising how many questions were asked in connection with the Romanian-Soviet treaty, and their questions proved that many of them had neither read the text of it nor had any knowledge of what had been said or written about this document. However, we welcomed the remarks that followed: "It would be absurd to believe that through tense relations with the USSR, we could serve the cause of our co-nationals in Bessarabia. Some calls were heard urging us to cross the Prut River. However, it was not specified exactly how to cross it, with tanks or with armored vehicles? Why do some say that we were the first ones to conclude a treaty with the USSR? Why do they not say that we were the first ones who abrogated the old treaty?"

The show went on in the same alert way when the domestic issue was discussed. "The demonstration held on Tuesday [23 April] in the University Square began in a civilized manner but unfortunately toward evening it degenerated and I regret it. Likewise, I regret that the movie at the Scala Cinema is of—as I was told—an instigating nature. I am sorry that it was produced under the aegis of the Ministry of Culture. The cassette containing the recording of the dialogue between the former minister of interior, Chitac, and one of the commanders of the police is false. This act is punishable, and I will ask for an investigation."

In conclusion, Mr. Iliescu proved to be gallant and complimented a woman journalist on her youth and pleasant appearance, which contrasted with the "malicious tone" of her articles.

Briefly: Although he stated that he did not want to compete with Mr. Bush, Mr. Iliescu proved to be a good showman.

Republican Presidents on Future Relations

LD2904223491 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1825 GMT 29 Apr 91

[Text] Cetinje, 29 Apr (TANJUG)—At a news conference in Cetinje this evening the presidents of the six Yugoslav republics, or of the republican presidencies, talked about the details of today's penultimate round of talks on the country's future system.

The main topic of the six presidents' fifth meeting in the Plavi Dvor [Blue Castle] at Cetinje was the expected referendum. As journalists learned during the day, there were "considerable differences between the republics".

The first question for the six presidents asked by a TANJUG reporter was: Have you started to feel personal responsibility and fear that, because of your failure to agree, civil war might break out?

[Croatian President] Franjo Tudjman said that the presidents were not like school children who are all asked the same question. He suggested that each president be asked separate questions. In response the TANJUG reporter asked Tudjman to reply to the above question.

In his brief reply Tudjman said that as far as he was concerned, he did not feel any personal responsibility. "Those who threaten civil war are doing it to avoid democratic solutions to all the problems," he added.

Although he was not invited to answer, Bosnia-Herzegovina President Alija Izetbegovic asked to speak. He agreed that there is a realistic danger of civil war, but he went on to say that he personally will bear no responsibility because he has been advocating a compromised solution that can lead to a way out of the crisis. This solution unfortunately was not accepted. Izetbegovic also said that the amount of responsibility to be borne by each of the six presidents is not the same.

Montenegro leader Momir Bulatovic, however, "accepted" his responsibility but stressed that all six presidents have been investing maximum efforts and goodwill. "If in the end we turn out to be unsuccessful and bad negotiators and if the policy of irrational conflicts is allowed to continue, we will have more reason to fear a civil war," Bulatovic said in conclusion.

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic also stressed that he feels great personal responsibility and that precisely for that reason he insists that all citizens are given an opportunity in a referendum to have their say over such vital and fateful issues.

Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov noted that in a crisis like this one there is no citizen who is not concerned. He said he would feel personally responsible only if he did not favor a dialogue and a continued search for solutions. Our problems are such, Gligorov warned, that they cannot be resolved in a spectacular manner. The solutions will not be a result of someone's whim; rather they will stem from historical legacies and will be the

result of profound contradictions and our ability to abandon a system that proved to be unsuitable as a basis for resolving the crisis. It is an illusion that these problems can be resolved over night and through an agreement between the six of us, Gligorov said.

Slovene President Milian Kucan noted that civil war is no alternative to democratic dialogue and that he would not have taken part in the talks if he did not feel responsible. He said the presidents are promoting ideas formulated by their republics. As these ideas are different, current talks are only preliminary to political negotiations at a later stage, Kucan said.

A journalist from Skopje TV asked if a step forward was made today or whether the presidents are going around in circles and wasting their time," as Kucan is supposed to have said unofficially. The journalist also wanted to know how much the referendum would cost, adding that the figure of 150 million dollars had been mentioned.

A brief silence in which the presidents could not decide which of them was going to answer first was broken by Momir Bulatovic who said that today the presidents only informed each other about how and what steps would be taken by individual republics. I see this as continuing the practice of unilateral decisions and conduct that can never contribute to democratic ways of overcoming the constitutional and political crisis. Nor will any contribution be made by what are, to say the least, suggestive questions some republics plan to ask in the referendum.

The referendum will cost a great deal of money, but democracy is expensive. If the referendum is well thought-out and proves to be the first step out of the constitutional and political crisis, its cost—which, by the way, I doubt is that high—will be fully justified.

Kiro Gligorov noted that the character, results, and effects of the referendum depend on whether the republics are treated as individual states or territorial communities and whether the voting will be by individual citizens or nations. The differences are considerable and no significant step was made today.

Gligorov said that he does not know how much the referendum will cost and that each republic should draw up its own estimate.

Because the differences are great and controversial issues are of major importance we need an arbitrator, Slobodan Milosevic said adding that he sees the citizens and the nations of Yugoslavia as the sole arbitrator through the referendum.

Milan Kucan said he is not satisfied with the meeting since today is the third time the issue of the referendum and the initial differences over Yugoslavia and the causes of the constitutional crisis have been put on the agenda. We are constantly running away from the next set of issues and from the principles to be used as a basis for regulating our rights and obligations and common interests. Kucan noted that because of this Slovenia will

implement the decision of its plebiscite not because it wants to but because it will be forced to do it.

Kucan said he knows the cost of the plebiscite in Slovenia, stressing that it costs much less than tanks in the streets or a civil war.

A DELO correspondent asked if he considers as correct views by a section of the Montenegro public and the opposition that Bulatovic is "his poodle". The president of Serbia said that he and the Montenegro presidency president are cooperating on equal terms. The same journalist asked if it is true that there was a count of Montenegrin heads in Belgrade. Milosevic said that he knows nothing about it. This was greeted with applause by journalists in the room.

A BORBA correspondent asked whether Alija Izetbegovic has changed his view expressed this morning that talks are going in circles and that there will probably be no other meeting of the six [republican presidents] and whether he will host a meeting that will agree on the dissociation of the Yugoslav republics or on keeping Yugoslavia as a community. Izetbegovic first noted that it can be seen from the statement that his claim about going in circles is not unfounded.

However he drew attention to a "small novelty" from this morning's talks. Gligorov and I share a common view that we will persevere in the conviction of the Yugoslav public and citizens that some form of the Yugoslav community should be kept, and that this is in the vital interests of the citizens and nations of Yugoslavia. These interests exist. They should be identified and we should establish how to realize them. In my view this is the only trace of hope.

In response to the second half of the question, Izetbegovic said that the next meeting of the six will be held in Bosnia- Hercegovina, most likely on 8 May.

Slobodan Milosevic made "a principled remark" to the question about whether it is possible to agree on the dissociation of Yugoslavia at a meeting of the republican presidents. "Not a single one of us sitting here has a mandate to agree on the abolition of Yugoslavia."

Milan Kucan intervened, to avoid confusion I repeated to Mr. Milosevic that dissociation is not the same as abolition. "I do not differentiate between those two things," Milosevic explained. "This is where you are mistaken," Kucan concluded. Following this the journalists applauded.

A VJESNIK correspondent asked Franjo Tudjman if at today's talks they did not discuss the burning issue of Knin.

Tudjman said that Knin was not discussed in particular, but that they talked about the problem.

"You probably are thinking of events in Kijevo," Tudjman said and stressed that the events in this village revived one problems which Croatia has been facing:

violations of the republic's constitutional order and the attitude of the Yugoslav Presidency and the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] toward these violations.

"[SFRY Presidency President Borisav] Jovic and some in the JNA leadership were not concerned when these outlaws started to violate the democratic constitutional order in Croatia by erecting barricades, stopping traffic, wounding people, and even causing several deaths," Tudjman noted.

"They were concerned and immediately reacted when we established the rule of law in Plitvice or when we set up a police station in Jijevo for the benefit of the rule of law in both Croatia and Yugoslavia. This all has an impact on the world's perception of Yugoslavia and on economic and political relations."

"It seems that some people are incapable of learning," Tudjman noted stressing that the Croatian Republic did not give in to JNA ultimatums regarding the withdrawal from Plitvice. The same is true of yesterday when an ultimatum was issue for the special police forces to withdraw from Kijevo. They refused.

Instead of drawing conclusions that such moves cause dissatisfaction among the people and negative attitudes toward the JNA, the Presidency was again convened, and again does not act in line with the proclaimed policy of recognizing the legitimate government in Croatia. It almost openly sides with outlaws. This will naturally cause the Croatian government and Assembly to make definite moves, Tudjman stressed.

Because he took part in the work of the mentioned session of the SFRY Presidency, Momir Bulatovic stressed that the SFRY Presidency does not openly side with anyone. It did attempt, in line with its stands and political estimates, to do everything to avoid conflict which, according to last night's reports, was unavoidable.

Not disputing what Tudjman said, Bulatovic stated that he heard other information that indicates that the JNA is trying not to take sides in complex and dramatic situations, but that it takes the side of citizens and tries to secure their peace.

In my interpretation of the rule of law, to call someone an outlaw you should do it in concrete, individual cases and only after gathering indisputable evidence. Bulatovic added. His words were followed by applause.

Is the aspiration to establish the republic's sovereignty motivated by the desire to gain international recognition since, if Yugoslavia disintegrates, only Serbia and Montenegro will be entitled to the status of sovereign republics, the Pobjeda correspondent asked.

Every nation strives for sovereignty and, by implication, for international status, Tudjman said. He asked, with a slight amount of surprise, why only Serbia and Montenegro would be entitled to that right and not other nations and especially, why not the Croatian nation, as

one of the oldest historical nations in Europe which in its pre-1918 history was never without the special attributes of statehood?

A Belgrade TV journalist asked about the position of the Serbian nation in Croatia in light of the fact that when speaking about the referendum President Tudjman addressed only the Croatian people and citizens.

Sovereign Croatia guarantees cultural autonomy and all civil rights to Serbs in Croatia and to all other nationalities, Tudjman said. Rest assured that in the Republic of Croatia Serbs and members of other nations will have recognized not just what Croatians in other republics today cannot expect to have recognized, but also everything that every nation expects to have recognized by the democratic public in the world and under democratic world conventions.

A JEDINSTVO of Pristina journalist asked Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman how the issue of Serbia and Croatia can be resolved without Yugoslavia.

I favor Yugoslavia and not solutions without Yugoslavia, Milosevic said tersely.

"We favor new foundations on which relations between the nations and the republics of Yugoslavia will be built. To our knowledge this is possible only within an alliance of sovereign states," Tudjman said. If this is accepted, then we are for a community within present-day Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia has not been around since time immemorial. For thousands of years its nations lived without it but became united to gain more freedom and a better life. Since their expectations, or at least the expectations of the Croatian people, have not been fulfilled we are in search of a system which will guarantee the Croatian nation its equality and sovereignty, Tudjman said adding that because such a community cannot provide the necessary guarantees, no harm will be done if they are sought in full independence within the European Community, as other nations have been attempting.

A JEDINSTVO journalist noted that Kiro Gligorov was active for 45 years in Tito's federal Yugoslavia, and now he is advocating a confederal Yugoslavia. He asked Gligorov whether he was sincere then or now.

"You are asking me this as if nothing has happened in Yugoslavia and as if nations are not trying to realize their national aspirations," Gligorov said. If all postwar constitutions, from 1945 to the present day, said that republics are states, I do not see why this should be denied today. I do not understand why we should argue about the future form of the state. We should talk about common interests and functions, to preserve the Yugoslav community.

According to Gligorov, the road to the preservation of the Yugoslav community does not have to be the road of maximum community if we bear in mind circumstances in which we live and the mood in the republics, as well as certain efforts invested by these republics in resolving

issues that are remnants of the past and whose resolution under the present circumstances cannot be delayed.

Therefore, it is too simple to think that only those advocating a federation are for the Yugoslav community and its survival. This could, in fact, lead to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Gligorov noted. At this moment, the best thing would be to champion the minimum of functions which would preserve the Yugoslav community, and then let life and development take their course, as is happening in Europe now, Gligorov said.

A Radio Novi Sad journalist asked Bosnian President Izetbegovic to make his views known about the creation of the communities of municipalities in Bosanska Krajina and Eastern or Old Hercegovina and to say whether he views these as "phantom" creations.

Izetbegovic stressed that he does not use the expression "phantom creation," and that he has heard this for the first time. True, these are single-nation communities in Bosnia-Hercegovina, which is a common state of Muslims, Serbs, and Croatia. Those who are creating single-nation sociopolitical communities within it, are destroying the very foundations on which a common state, such as Bosnia-Hercegovina, is based.

From the preliminary results of the census it can be seen that the population is mixed. Someone who wants to take for himself what is common, is creating chaos in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Is there any point in creating purely Serbian municipalities in Bosnia-Hercegovina, in drawing maps not based on the logic of economy? Izetbegovic assessed that the creation of a purely Serbian region in Bosnia-Hercegovina does not lead to anything good. We will, of course, oppose it because it destroys Bosnia-Hercegovina, Izetbegovic stressed.

I do not know the basis for your claims that an Islamic community is being created in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Our orientation is to create a civilian republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Izetbegovic said. We hold that the citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina and not individual nations should vote on the future of the republic.

According to him, the story about Islamic conceptions provides a pretext for the destruction of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina and an excuse in the face of Europe for saying that we have to destroy this republic because an Islamic republic is being created. Such rumors are not based on arguments, Izetbegovic stressed.

A Croatian radio and TV journalist asked Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic what the Croatian leadership has done to the Serbian population in that republic. He also asked the Croatian president to comment.

It is giving it the status of a national minority on the basis of the Constitution, on the basis of the question to be asked in a referendum, and on the basis of many other pressures and acts of violence, including qualifications about outlaws and banditry, Slobodan Milosevic said. We see that the inclination to become outlaws is not

confined to one nation. He recalled the stand from the statement that it is artificial to ask whether citizens or nations are voting in the referendum, because if people vote only as citizens then only majority nations will vote, whereby the right to self-determination of other nations will be denied. Therefore, equal Yugoslav nations would become national minorities in republics, Milosevic said.

Difficulties in Yugoslavia stem from the fact that many believe that the status of the governing nation belongs to Serbs in all republics, Tudjman noted. He illustrated this with a statement made by a prominent Serbian intellectual, a creator of the memorandum, who, when asked what the Croatian government did to cause dissatisfaction of the Serbian people in Croatia, i.e. what that government should be like, said in the latest issue of NIN that irrespective of what policy Croatia conducts, Serbs would be mobilized in the same manner, because the time has come for the realization of the idea of a Serbian state.

A REUTER correspondent asked Presidents Tudjman and Kucan whether they have precise indicators as to what their peoples would gain or lose by separating themselves from Yugoslavia, as well as why they insist on altering the country, when it is obvious that at the federal level their republics are sovereign. He asked Milosevic why Serbia accedes to having an unequal position in the federation, where "one Slovene is worth the same as four Serbs?"

"Every nation on this earth, since the beginning of the world, aspires to be master in its own home, i.e., to have its own name in the international order and its own armed forces," Tudjman said, and explained that Croatia wishes to be its own master so the Croatian individual is not punished for singing Croatian songs, as he was a year ago, and so as to arrange its own relations with others as an equal dealing with equals. Regarding relations in the federation, the Croatian president said that future relations should be organized in precisely such a way that the question of who has more representatives—in view of the fact that "what the Croats have had at the federal level has not been to the benefit of Croatia"—is not raised. A community should be in the interest of all peoples, and not only of one, Tudjman said, observing that the very fact that only Serbia and Montenegro are insisting on a united and, he said, even more centralized Yugoslavia, is also indicative of relations in the federation.

Yugoslavia, as a multinational and federal state, should have a bicameral legislature—a Citizens' Chamber on the principle of "one citizen, one vote," and a Peoples' Chamber, in which equal representation, to protect the small nations in relation to the large nations, should be ensured, Milosevic said. He termed this a good formula for the structure of a representative parliament of a complex state.

To "his own" question, Kucan replied that Slovenes, by becoming separate from Yugoslavia, would be making a

decision on placing their own future in their own hands, at least as regards those who live in Slovenia, and Slovenia, as a democratic creation in Europe, would concern itself in the most effective way with the actions of Slovene people in other countries. However, Kucan would not concur with the assessment that no one is interfering in the internal affairs of Slovenia. Turning to the REUTER journalist, he said: "You probably have not managed to read through the speeches by Jovic and Markovic, or you do not know what the Army is doing." Invoking the previous words of the Serbian president, Kucan observed that not only is Milosevic not drawing a distinction between annulment [ukinuće] and separation, but he does not draw a distinction between Serbia and the other republics.

A Montenegrin television reporter expressed interest in knowing if it was distrust or fear that prompted President Tudjman to be the only one to come to Cetinje in a bullet-proof BMW. The Croatian president, pointing out that he arrived by plane, as the other gentlemen probably had, referred the journalist to the Ministry of Internal Affairs which, he claims, has information from Yugoslavia and from three European states "that they are preparing to assassinate" both him and the other presidents.

These words were greeted in the hall of the press center with murmuring, which Tudjman commented on, saying: "This gathering of journalists is very interesting." I do not know, Tudjman went on, where the protest meetings have been held here, but judging by this applause, it is clear that this evening's meeting was organized. I do not wish to participate further, Tudjman said. Despite the intervention of the host, Bulatovic, who asked those present to refrain from making comments and to adhere to mutual respect, Tudjman left the news conference a few minutes later, accompanied by renewed applause from the auditorium.

A Radio Macedonia journalist asked Bulatovic and Gligorov to assess the possibility that the question in the referendum read: "For or against the reform program—11-plus-three?" and he asked Izetbegovic if he could convince colleagues that the next meeting in Bosnia-Herzegovina would last two days, so as to end this "presidential and journalists' caravan?"

Gligorov explained that for the success of the referendum it is essential to complete these talks, especially as, with the formula put forward by the journalists, they would not obtain an answer to the question of how to ensure the success of the reform program, while at the same time find out what the future community would be like.

Montenegro was among the first to support the "11-plus-three" proposal, but this program showed itself to be impossible in this situation, Bulatovic said, and pointed out that this republic has already criticized the federal premier for not saying expressly what obstacles

he is facing. The president of the Presidency of Montenegro mentioned that he had heard that "11-plus-three" reminds one of 11 past three on 4 May. [time when Tito died in 1980]

Izetbegovic recalled that the presidents have so far "expended" 70 hours, but nevertheless today's meeting, in his assessment, is roughly the same as the first meeting in terms of its results. Nothing will change even if next time we have negotiations for two days, because nobody, Izetbegovic believes, is prepared to move from his position by one step in the direction of another, or stay for five minutes in "the skin of another." If pressure from our public, and social pressure, does not help, and if external pressures in the form of threats, requests, or promises do not help, I am not convinced that anything will be achieved in Sarajevo, Izetbegovic said, and added that he is nonetheless an optimist by nature, and not on the basis of concrete circumstances. In any event, Izetbegovic finds the reason for the negotiations in the hope that the negotiations could remove the possibility of clashes.

Following these assessments by the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the one-hour news conference ended.

Presidents Issue Statement

LD2904214191 Zagreb Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1750 GMT 29 Apr 91

[Statement by Montenegrin Information Secretary Momcilo Stoyanovic at a news conference of the presidents of the SFRY republics following their meeting in Cetinje on 29 April—live]

[Text] Respected presidents, fellow journalists, listeners and viewers of radio and television: Let me first read a statement from today's meeting of the republican presidents and presidents of the republican presidencies.

At a meeting held today in Cetinje, the republican presidents and the presidents of the republican presidencies continued their talks on the political future of Yugoslavia and ways of resolving the state and political crisis in the country. The central issues at today's discussions were the procedures and timing of referendums in the republics, as well as the questions that should be put to the citizens; that is, the nations of Yugoslavia. In the talks on these issues, the known differences were manifested.

In the view of the presidents of Montenegro and Serbia, referendums should be held in all republics on the same day and, at the same time; they should ask the same questions and, prior to the referendums, citizens should be informed about possible solutions and their consequences. This would ensure that the results of referendums in all republics could be compared.

The Slovene president pointed out that the will of the Slovene people has already been expressed in the

Slovene plebiscite. The Slovene Assembly proposed to all republics that negotiated dissociation of the SFRY, including regulation of mutual rights and obligations, should begin, as well as talks about a possible future community of sovereign states, if other republics are interested and willing.

The Croatian president announces that the Croatian Republic has already decided to hold a referendum on these issues in the Croatian Republic on 19 May.

The Macedonian president holds that, because of the preparations necessary for the referendum, the deadline for the referendum should be extended to 15 June.

Regarding the form of questions to be asked in the referendum, as well as the procedure for calling the referendum, the Macedonian president said that these will be formulated by the Macedonian Assembly. The referendum will provide a clear answer on the character of the future Yugoslav community and its preservation as either an alliance of sovereign states or a federal state.

It was agreed that the next meeting will open a discussion on common interests and functions of the future community, rights and obligations, and life together (?so far) in Yugoslavia, and that the SFRY Presidency will be informed of the results.

Alija Izetbegovic the president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina presidency, stated that it will most likely be proposed to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly to formulate the referendum questions so the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina vote first about whether they are for Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign and indivisible republic within a Yugoslav community, and then about the character of the future community, as agreed in Brdo kod Kranja.

Izetbegovic and President Gligorov of Macedonia presented the view that true interests of the nations and citizens of present-day Yugoslavia demand that a form of Yugoslav community, based on sovereignty of republics as states, survives. Regarding this, it would be necessary to identify common interests—because they surely exist—that would be realized through common functions and common bodies. They reiterated their conviction that this is the only real possibility for a Yugoslav community to be preserved and transformed, and a necessary condition for receiving international support, without which there can be no program to find a way out of the economic crisis and without which Yugoslavia could not become part of an integrated Europe.

The presidents of Montenegro and Serbia stressed that it is artificial to ask whether citizens or nations vote in a referendum, because if people vote only in their capacity as citizens and not in their capacity as members of the Yugoslav nations in all republics, then the referendum will be just a vote of majority nations in the republics. This would annul the right to self-determination of other Yugoslav nations living in the republics, and they,

although equal Yugoslav nations, would be treated as national minorities. This would be an act of voting on the basis of nationality in the republics; that is, the right of nations to self-determination by citizens' votes would be exercised only by the majority nation in a republic. The president of the Serbian Republic and the president of the Montenegrin presidency also pointed out that the federal bodies cannot be excluded from the process of making binding decisions about Yugoslavia in a procedure established for changing the SFRY Constitution, in which republican bodies are also taking part. In this sense, a referendum is a way of establishing the political stand and will of citizens and nations, which precedes legal decisionmaking in the SFRY Assembly.

The representatives of Montenegro and Serbia, proceeding from the SFRY Constitution and the legitimacy of Yugoslav institutions and bodies, and in connection with these issues and the conflicting views expressed so far in the talks, believe it is necessary for an expanded session of the SFRY Presidency to attempt to reach a common solution; that is, to establish a common stance on the referendum, and then draw up a draft for further discussions about solutions and a way out of the Yugoslav crisis. This presupposes a harmonized proposal regarding amendments and addenda to the Yugoslav Constitution.

This was the text of the statement:

[Zecevic] Are you the Serbian Socialist Party's [SPS] government? What is your government's attitude toward the SPS program and how much are you, as a government, bound by it?

[Zelenovic] We are the government nominated by the SPS, but at present we consider ourselves the government of Serbian citizens. We do acknowledge the SPS program, but they have already reproached us for being more flexible. For example, in the Constitution as well as in the SPS program it is stated: all forms of property are equal. We said: fair enough, but we have a project of transforming public property into private stockholding companies. We knew that they were very sensitive on this question, but we have not hurt the SPS program with our program. If a certain socially owned company proves that it would be better for it to remain a socially owned company, no one will stop it in remaining such. There is no need to debate about this at great length. We have now taken a stand that the process of privatization must be carried out in full, if not for its affects, but for the pressure that is being exerted on Serbia concerning this question.

Also, we have agreed to invite the SPS Executive Committee for talks on this party's strategy and its development in the way that we perceive it, because we think that at the moment our stands differ slightly from those of the party. This party is inflexible, it does not possess a leading cadre that could secure further prosperity for us. The party is not ready to appear on the international scene; it is waiting for our program to become its own

when it should really adjust its own program. Our government, as well as any other government, needs a modern, European party. For instance, for me this means that the SPS must become a member of the Socialist International of Europe. Just as we are striving to receive equal treatment throughout Europe in the sphere of economy, so should the SPS make efforts in the political sphere. It should contact Mitterrand, Brandt, Vranitzky, and others.

[Zecevic] You think that the SPS should modify its program and its behavior?

[Zelenovic] Yes.

[Zecevic] Nevertheless, you are a member of this party, and as such, you were asked to form a government. Do you think this is logical?

[Zelenovic] I think it is logical. Of course, opinions vary, in this and all other parties, but I have personally taken a stand that more flexibility is needed. Not toward the extreme left. To accomplish various programs and make contacts with various companies throughout the world, I am forced to make certain compromises—compromises that a party member perhaps does not see or feel.

For instance, they reproached us for our projects in the spheres of education and health care and they completely rejected our plan for the Pensions and Disabled Persons Insurance organization's policies. We demanded that all expenses for the first year students be paid for, but if a student repeats the year, then he should pay all his expenses in full—accommodation, food, and everything. However, we have also planned for certain financial participation by students, regardless of how diligent they might be. They flatly rejected this proposal, and said that it is not in the party's program and, therefore, could not be accepted.

[Zecevic] How did things work out at the end?

[Zelenovic] The government remained firm on the stand that the first year students have their expenses paid, that is that registration in the normal year is free of charge, while any subsequent registration in the same year must be paid by the student himself.

[Zecevic] Were they also firm on their stand?

[Zelenovic] No, on this matter they agreed with us, but they were against introducing financial participation for health care. They did not wish to debate the issue of imposing restrictions on the Pensions and Disabled Persons Insurance organization's policies at all, especially not for the higher pensions. They said that people have earned this money with their work despite the fact that workers complain greatly about pensions being higher than salaries. The party that proclaims social justice as its principle did not allow this, therefore, we did not discuss this option. We adjusted our stands to match the party's in this case.

[Zecevic] Do you merely hold consultations or do they pose conditions to you?

[Zelenovic] Before our program went to the Assembly we were obliged to present our program to the SPS Main Committee. [passage omitted]

Zelenovic on SPS-Government Relations

AU2904090091 Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
19 Apr 91 pp 17-18

[Interview with Serbian Prime Minister Dr. Dragutin Zelenovic by Velizar Zecevic; place and date not given: "We Deserve a Better Party"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Zecevic] Speaking like somebody who works in advertising, you spent six hours presenting the government's program to the Assembly, which scared all the radio listeners. Could you present the program in five sentences to our readers—what do you consider to be the essence of your program?

[Zelenovic] When we analyzed the situation, we ascertained deficits in all spheres of the economy, especially in the superstructure. We realized that production must be the major driving force in the program's development. Furthermore, we were contemplating what we could do, keeping in mind that the Federal Government has already forecast a 15 to 20 percent drop in production this year, which is simply disastrous.

We then asked ourselves: why is production falling? Because our market has lost its power. The transition from clearing account payments to convertible currency payments has completely destroyed the Soviet market. Two years ago, our trade with the Soviet Union amounted to \$8 billion, in 1990 to a bit less than \$3 billion, while in the first four months of this year this trade was worth \$100 million. True enough, these are results for Yugoslavia as a whole, but Serbia has a great share in them.

The Iranian, Iraqi, and Kuwaiti markets have also contracted. We used to have a significant share in these markets, particularly our construction firms.

Finally, our relatively steady increase on the Western markets is conditioned by a requirement for high standards and competitive prices.

Can we return to the Soviet market? Everyone in the world who has some self-respect at all is now "running" for this market. This market is enormous and it will, in my opinion, engage the entire Western economy for the next 10 years. To start, with the Russian Federation alone we signed an agreement to exchange \$2 billion worth of goods this year—using clearing account or convertible currency payments, and also the so-called barter arrangements, that is a sort of counter trade. These are the agreements of Serbia!

The Western markets, with which we deal little, although we are technologically very successful there, are the other

area that enables us to develop our technology and learn to improve ourselves for, among other things, the Russian market. Currently, we are trying to return to the Iraqi and Kuwaiti markets.

Therefore, there are markets open to all countries that are capable of doing something. There is no other way. [passage omitted]

[Zecevic] You have been reproached that the reduction of the administrative apparatus, in effect, equals the dissolution of administration in the provinces?

[Zelenovic] This is the smaller part of the job. Communes, districts, and then the republic, represent the greater part of the job. The Serbian government has 36,000 employees on its payroll, 17,500 of which are policemen.

[Zecevic] How will the Republic be organized?

[Zelenovic] In my opinion, the Constitution has not satisfactorily solved the problem of the provinces. They stand in the way of what I would like to say. We are proposing a system with three levels: communes, districts, and the republic. Provinces would have the representative functions—to deal with the problems of language, minorities, minorities' culture, folklore, etc., and perhaps some other function of minor importance. In any case, a commune is an assemblage of the registered communes or settlements, a district is an assemblage of several communes, and a republic is an assemblage of 15 to 19 districts; it still remains to be seen how many.

We would like to have the government's men in districts, either a republican secretary for this district or the chief of the district. He would be surrounded by the inspectorates. This man would convey the government's directives to every settlement in the district. In this way we could quickly and efficiently communicate "downward" as well as get the information "upward."

About 40 percent of the administrative apparatus should disappear, all those numerous public defenders of self-management, prosecutor's offices, and the rest. [passage omitted]

Suster on New Economic Proposals

AU2604155991 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA
in Serbo-Croatian 19 Apr 91 p 13

[Interview with Economic Chamber President Dagmar Suster by Stefan Novak; place and date not given: "It Would Be Difficult for Things To Be Worse Than They Are"]

[Excerpts] [Novak] To what extent can the aggressive policy of the once lifeless chamber be attributed to your taking over the post of president?

[Suster] It is only possible to shape the kind of chamber that we are trying to shape at the moment under specific social circumstances. If specific conditions were not

what they were, this would not be possible. I must also say that we have a very clear vision of what kind of chamber we would like to create in the next four years. However, circumstances are forcing us to change things more quickly. Under different circumstances, we would have done everything that we have done so far regarding the functioning of the chamber in a much longer period of time. However, time is simply extorting quicker steps from us and, to be quite direct, we are making use of this. It would not be sensible not to take advantage of the opportunity to construct a new chamber that is being offered under these conditions.

Apart from this, I want to stress that we have to all intents and purposes a completely new leadership in the chamber. In the narrowest sense, I have been virtually the only one left from the old leadership, and I came to the chamber two years ago. Third, perhaps there is a personal note, but this is definitely not the decisive one. If the other two conditions were not met, I could be whatever you wanted, but that would not be enough. In short, what everything requires is, first of all, the right conditions, a good team, and last but not least public support.

[Novak] Markovic's 11-point program has not yet received support. However, your proposed measures in seven points also need the consensus of all the republics.

[Suster] I almost do not believe that the heads of the republican chambers have not had any consultations with the heads of their republican states, and I therefore assess that our proposal is not without any chance, although I am highly skeptical. In any case, if the right economic policy measures are not adopted, my forecast is extremely pessimistic and bleak: the economic system will collapse very quickly, with all the consequences for the superstructure and the social sphere, which through its pressures also determines changes in the political sphere. [passage omitted]

[Novak] What do you particularly blame Ante Markovic's government for?

[Suster] In my opinion, one of the characteristics of this government was the fact that it has persisted in its intentions, which is a compliment, but, on the other hand, it has been inadmissibly obstinate, which is a criticism. That is to say, in practical terms, it has not accepted anything that was presented by the business world and the republican states, or by specialists, economists, and so on. The question arises of where the realistic boundary is between self-consciousness and belief in what you are doing and persistence, endurance, and obstinacy, particularly if this becomes counterproductive, if you do not hear what you are being told and do not see what is actually happening. We have already dearly paid for this in some areas.

[Novak] At the session of the Executive Committee of the Economic Chamber of Yugoslavia your proposed measures were only openly criticized by the president of

the chamber of Bosnia-Herzegovina who said that some measures were not sufficiently precise and that some were mutually exclusive.

[Suster] We worked very seriously on this program by consulting with prominent economists. The program deliberately does not have quantifications because at one such session we were unable to say, for example, by how much the dinar should be devalued, nor did we present any other quantifications, even though we have them, because then this would no longer be a serious approach. At the end of the day, this is nevertheless not our job and we cannot directly propose this to the Assembly as an alternative program, at least not under the existing conditions. It is also not true that the measures are mutually exclusive. On the contrary, things are even so consistent that we could formulate the problem in the opposite way: It is not possible to leave anything out because if anything is omitted, this is no longer what it was. Simply put, all the measures depend on each other, and this also applies to certain quantifications. [passage omitted]

[Novak] The public expected that the business people at the session of the Executive Committee of the Economic Chamber of Yugoslavia would at least raise the question of confidence in the Federal Government. Instead of that, you offered the business world a choice between your program and the government's.

[Suster] If we want to be honest, one cannot attribute only negative results to this government and thus overlook all the pluses and merits that it has regarding changes in the political and economic system and the results of the economic policy in the first half of 1991, because that would simply not be correct. Therefore, the people who had expected that we would be brutal in our criticism of the Federal Executive Council and that we would politicize this criticism, that is to say that we would link it to the question of confidence in the government or its replacement, and even offer an alternative government, were deceiving themselves. We think that this is not our job. After all, for those who know the situation, we have been more than critical enough because we have spoken more than explicitly about the implications. The essence of the aforementioned experiment lies in the fact that this government's arena has been extremely restricted. I will not get into how restricted it has become because in our country such things involve a lot of politics, speculation, and plotting. I do not agree to play these games. After all, everything will come to the fore in the near future.

[Novak] In this interview, we simply cannot avoid the issue connected with the idea of the new "economic government," for whose president you are the only candidate at the moment.

[Suster] As is known, the idea stemmed from the business community. And the fact that it has received this kind of reaction from the domestic public and in a large part of the international public too, only proves that the

idea has certain support and specific objective conditions in which it is taken seriously. However, I am not claiming—and I want to be quite categorical in this respect—that this idea of an “economic government” is right, and even less that Dagmar Suster is the right choice when it comes to this government.

However, the reactions to this idea have, in my opinion, definitely shown that support for the present government has been shaken and that the situation in the economy requires the kind of cabinet that will deal in an expert and pragmatic way with the problems in the economy and not so much the general state problems. However, since we are already talking about this, I think that all this perhaps involved pressure, that some people used the idea to create pressure on the government, in which respect, I do not discount the possibility that this pressure began definite underhanded dealings concerning certain material interests. It is not totally impossible that even the latest money issue was linked to this; one of the people taking part in the discussion at our session openly said that this issue paid for the support of certain parts of Yugoslavia.

The Chamber Is Not in Favor of Confrontations

[Novak] Some people think that the government should not be touched until an agreement is reached on the state's new structure because the fall of the government before then would paralyze not only the talks but also the country's economic life.

[Suster] It is quite certain that the way in which things are progressing now is not good. However, on the other hand, perhaps the government itself should raise the question of its role, power, and impotence, which would perhaps heighten the question of its credibility and more quickly lead to certain solutions. In this respect, I, of course, see another risk connected with our practice and the time factor. That is to say, the risk lies in the fact that such things have lasted for a terribly long time in our country. The question is whether we have already gone so far that we should do some things more quickly, including changing the government. If a new government were to be set up and this process were to last for months, then this would be a catastrophe. However—and I will be a little malicious here—things cannot be much worse than they already are. Therefore, the response to the claim that changing the government would paralyze everything, could be that everything is paralyzed anyway.

I am not familiar with the procedure for replacing and establishing a new government, nor at the end of the day does it interest me. [passage omitted]

Slovenia's Kucan on Independence

LD2604094791 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1556 GMT 24 Apr 91

[Excerpts] Ljubljana, 24 Apr (TANJUG)—The plebiscite's decision that we want to be a sovereign state, and

that we want to regulate by agreement the relations stemming from our common life in Yugoslavia, can be discussed with neither the other republics nor with the Federation's services. Slovene Republic President Milan Kucan stressed this at today's session of all three chambers of the Republic of Slovenia as he was acquainting delegates with his activities and those of the Presidency of Slovenia at implementing the plebiscite decision.

Kucan said that talks can be conducted only about how to regulate all those relations by agreement. European and other countries are drawing our attention to this fact which is the fundamental condition for us to win any kind of recognition and cooperation, Kucan added.

“This is why in the talks we persevered at winning recognition for the Slovene plebiscite and eventually managed that none of the republic negated it”, Kucan said. At the SFRY Presidency's sessions, Slovenia persisted in its position that the subject of the talks on Yugoslavia's future set-up of relations could only be sovereign republics and that the existing constitution could not provide a framework for resolving the crisis. [passage omitted]

We also advocated, Kucan added, that our proposal for dissociation, which already has been adopted by the Croatian Assembly, should be discussed as soon as possible by the assemblies of the other republics too. So far, Slovenia's assembly has not received any replies, something that, in Kucan's words, shows that there is no real willingness, or potential, to reach a genuinely new agreement of the Yugoslav peoples or their republics about their future life.

Citing the stands of the republics set out at the sessions of their representatives, Kucan noted that Serbia and Montenegro were committed to the preservation of Yugoslavia as a federal state. According to the assessment of these two republics, the peoples and republics can separate themselves from Yugoslavia only if they have agreed to this, that is, if everyone else's permission has been obtained in keeping with a uniformly applied procedure. The referendum's question can only be in terms of deciding on “yes” or “no” to one's separation from Yugoslavia. This approach does not recognize the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a republic, Kucan said. This reasoning does not recognize any other sovereignty other than Yugoslavia's whose statehood is internationally recognized. Yet, this fact, Kucan said, cannot annul another fact—that Yugoslavia was founded in 1918 and that its nations decided to reintroduce it in the national liberation struggle. The Slovene nation was never annexed by the Kingdom of Serbia, its political representatives decided to become united within a state of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and later within Yugoslavia. Except for the Serbian nation, Kucan assessed, this attitude obviously denies any other people national sovereignty but it nonetheless imperatively demands that wherever members of the Serbian people live they should be entitled to their own state. The other peoples in Yugoslavia, though, have this right only to the extent

to which their exercising this right helps the Serbian people assert their rights. This approach, in Kucan's view, is markedly outdated, focused on the past and is not based upon the sovereignty of the citizen that is the foundation of democracy.

The establishment of such a democracy of the citizen within a given state is also the foundation of democracy and equality among states, Kucan said. In his words, the framework of a national state within which only one nation lives can provide no basis for any agreement in Yugoslavia. According to this attitude Yugoslavia is primarily in the interest of the Serbian people while national interests of all the other peoples should be driven into submission to their interests, something Slovenia is not willing to accept, Kucan said.

In their stands Serbia's representatives are obviously appropriating the right to be in charge of the continuity of Yugoslavia, from which nations can only secede. Kucan considered this a concept that is at odds with historical facts and the complete valid existing legal and constitutional system and that demands that Serbia be entitled to the right of superiority and be granted recognition for its special status and interests in Yugoslavia. In Kucan's view, such attitudes are the best argument, not only for the domestic public but for the international public as well, that such foundations cannot provide an outline of relations either in a federal state or in an alliance of states.

The Presidency maintains that the talks on regulating future relations in Yugoslavia should continue, Kucan said. The mutual rights and obligations from the existing SFRY should be regulated, regardless of what the republics decide.

Kucan then presented seven principles as a proposal for regulating these relations; unforced, democratic, and gradual dissociation by agreement; forming the existing republics as independent, sovereign, and autonomous states or their union in one federal state; mutual recognition for the newly founded states as sovereign states and subjects under international law, and their integrity within the existing borders of the SFRY as well as within its state borders. The course of republic's independence must not be at the detriment of the same rights of the others; in their relations with third states and international organizations the republics must refrain from moves that may be at the expense of some republics and must help one another to win international recognition as soon as possible. Once any of the republics has established its independence none of the republics cannot regard itself as the sole legal heir to Yugoslavia. As far as its legal inheritance is considered all the republics are equal. And lastly, all questions concerning legal inheritance are solved in line with the existing provisions of international law, particularly those set out by the well-known Vienna convention.

"The new state of the Republic of Slovenia will respect all the principles of international law regarding the legal

heritage, and the regulations of all international agreements concluded by the SFRY", said Milan Kucan.

The expert basis for the agreement on the legal heritage of the SFRY, should be prepared by the Federal Executive Council [FEC]. It is also necessary to prepare a proposal on the structure of relations with the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA], especially as far as its departure from Slovene territory and the defense in general, is concerned. On the foundation of these principles it will be necessary to regulate a number of other issues, starting with citizenship, said Kucan.

"If the republics do not reach an agreement on the legal heritage, a procedure based on the principles of international law will be considered, that is, before an international court, or international arbitration. The institution of the CSCE, including the Center for the Prevention of Conflicts in Vienna, come into consideration as international mediators. Considering the real situation, it is necessary to prepare such a basis as well," Kucan stressed.

Kucan warned about great difficulties caused by the fact that a suitable program for realization of the plebiscite does not exist. It is therefore difficult to decide "whether conditions for the realization of the plebiscite are ready, or not, in other words, to what extent they are prepared, in order for Slovenia, de facto, to be able to establish real authority on its own territory", said Kucan, expressing his expectations that the FEC will inform the deputies about this, and that it will give a suitable proposal.

Kucan repeated the idea that the world is not prepared to accept changes that would bring conflicts, civil war, and disintegration, which the letter by U.S. President Bush, as well as the views of the European Twelve, indicate. All preparations and our own readiness to take over power in Slovenia should therefore be accelerated, and at the same time the international situation, which is undoubtedly unfavorable and which, as well as the situation in Yugoslavia, we are unable to influence, should be carefully observed, said Kucan.

According to him, the balance sheet of the separation should be sought from the FEC, while the fact that the current Federal Government insists in fact, on preserving Yugoslavia, should be kept in mind. However, it has clearly been shown that there is no way back and that the economic policy of the Federal Government has completely failed, says Kucan.

Poll on Referendum on Country's Future

AU2604112491

[Editorial Report] Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian on 17 April on page 7 of its VJESNIK U SRIJEDU supplement carries a 500-word report by Bruno Slogar on the results of VJESNIK's public opinion poll on the proposed referendum on the future structure of the country, entitled "A Union of Sovereign States Favored by 44.4 Percent."

The report does not provide any information on how the poll was conducted except that it was carried out by "telephone between 12 and 13 April and that it involved 500 respondents from all main cities in Yugoslavia. The sample comprises 70 respondents from the capital cities of the republics, and 40 respondents from the capital cities of the provinces."

The results of the poll are presented in three bar charts and one pie chart. The results presented in bar charts are expressed as frequencies and the results presented in the pie chart are expressed in percentages.

Table 1. "Should the future of the Yugoslav community be resolved by a referendum?" (table heading, figures expressed as frequencies)

Zagreb: (out of 70 respondents)	
Yes	about 50
No	between 15 and 20
Do not know	less than 5
Belgrade: (out of 70 respondents)	
Yes	about 50
No	about 10
Do not know	about 10
Titograd: (out of 70 respondents)	
Yes	about 60
No	less than 5
Do not know	between 5 and 10
Sarajevo: (out of 70 respondents)	
Yes	between 55 and 60
No	between 10 and 15
Do not know	less than 5
Ljubljana: (out of 70 respondents)	
Yes	between 45 and 50
No	between 5 and 10
Do not know	between 10 and 15
Skopje: (out of 70 respondents)	
Yes	between 50 and 55
No	less than 5
Do not know	between 10 and 15
Pristina: (out of 40 respondents)	
Yes	about 25
No	about 10
Do not know	between 5 and 10
Novi Sad: (out of 40 respondents)	

Yes	between 35 and 40
No	less than 5
Do not know	less than 5

Table 2. "If a referendum were to be held, you would vote for:" (table heading, figures expressed as frequencies)

Novi Sad: (out of 40 respondents)	
1. Union of sovereign states	about 5
2. United Yugoslavia	about 30
3. Would not vote in referendum	about less than 5
Pristina: (out of 40 respondents)	
1. Union of sovereign states	about 25
2. United Yugoslavia	about 10
3. Would not vote in referendum	less than 5
4. Do not know	less than 5
Skopje: (out of 70 respondents)	
1. Union of sovereign states	about 20
2. United Yugoslavia	between 35 and 40
3. Would not vote in referendum	less than 5
4. Do not know	about 5
Ljubljana: (out of 70 respondents)	
1. Union of sovereign states	about 45
2. United Yugoslavia	between 10 and 15
3. Would not vote in referendum	between 5 and 10
4. Do not know	less than 5
Sarajevo: (out of 70 respondents)	
1. Union of sovereign states	between 30 and 35
2. United Yugoslavia	between 30 and 35
3. Do not know	less than 5
Titograd: (out of 70 respondents)	
1. Union of sovereign states	between 10 and 15
2. United Yugoslavia	between 50 and 55
3. Would not vote in referendum	less than 5
4. Do not know	less than 5
Belgrade: (out of 70 respondents)	
1. Union of sovereign states	about 15
2. United Yugoslavia	between 40 and 45
3. Would not vote in referendum	between 5 and 10
4. Do not know	less than 5
Zagreb: (out of 70 respondents)	
1. Union of sovereign states	between 60 and 65
2. United Yugoslavia	less than 5
3. Would not vote in referendum	less than 5

Table 3. "All respondents—If a referendum were to be held, you would vote for:" (table heading, a pie chart with figures expressed in percentages)

1. Union of sovereign states	44.4
2. United Yugoslavia	46.6
3. Would not vote in referendum	5.2
4. Do not know	3.8

Table 4. "As part of the settlement of Yugoslav issue, should Kosovo Albanians be allowed to form a republic?" (table heading) (a bar chart with figures expressed as frequencies)

Zagreb: (out of 70 respondents)	
Yes	between 45 and 50
No	about 20
Belgrade: (out of 70 respondents)	
Yes	none
No	between 65 and 70
Titograd: (out of 70 respondents)	
Yes	less than 5
No	between 50 and 55
Sarajevo: (out of 70 respondents)	
Yes	about 40
No	between 25 and 30
Ljubljana: (out of 70 respondents)	
Yes	about 40
No	between 5 and 10
Skopje: (out of 70 respondents)	
Yes	none
No	between 60 and 65
Pristina: (out of 40 respondents)	
Yes	between 25 and 30
No	between 5 and 10
Novi Sad: (out of 40 respondents)	
Yes	less than 5
No	between 30 and 35

Albanians Reprove Division of Serbia

AU2604171491 Belgrade Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 26 Apr 91

[Milivoje Mihajlovic report]

[Text] The leadership of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo condemns the proposal that Serbia be divided into districts that would, as they say, deprive the province of any kind of autonomy. Albanians will not permit this division regardless of how much it will cost them. This was stated at a news conference in Pristina.

[Mihajlovic] The leadership of the most numerous party of Albanians holds the view that Prime Minister Ante Markovic was essentially correct in his assessment of the situation in Kosovo. Markovic's assessment that the human rights and freedoms of Albanians are at the lowest level and that relative peace is being maintained by repression and the activities of the Albanian Alternative Movement is fully accepted.

The leaders of this party hold the view that Markovic had to lament the position of Serbs, point to the intensification in separatism, and condemn the Kacanik Constitution. However, even this did not stop the Serbian government from opposing his assessments.

The leadership of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo takes the view that with his speech in the Federal Assembly, SFRY Presidency President Borisav Jovic outlined the way to block every solution to the Kosovo problem, because, as they say, in his essentially negative approach to the Kosovo issue he only spoke about Albanian separatism and did not say anything about the fact that the province is the most typical area where unconstitutionality and lawlessness reign.

Members of the top leadership of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo also take the view that the latest statement by the SFRY Presidency on the political and security situation in the country is also calling for further deterioration of the situation in the province.

The meeting between Ibrahim Rugova and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman was part of the regular cooperation between the Albanian Alternative Movement with Yugoslav parties.